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ERIE AS A CHOICE OF ENFORCEMENT DEFAULTS 
Sergio J. Campos
 
Abstract 
The Erie doctrine governs, among other things, when a federal court 
sitting in diversity jurisdiction may use a federal procedure that differs 
from the procedure a state court would use. Displacing the state procedure 
with the federal procedure (or not) may impact the substantive objectives 
of either state or federal law, but the current Erie doctrine provides little 
guidance. This Article argues that the Erie doctrine is best understood as 
governing a choice of enforcement defaults. As argued below, the primary 
function of civil liability is to protect a substantive entitlement to avoid the 
legal violation, either directly through specific performance remedies or 
through deterrence. Accordingly, procedures in federal and state court can 
be understood as default procedures to enforce this substantive entitlement, 
and these defaults are often abrogated by private contract or through 
legislation. Understood in this way, the Erie doctrine governs when a 
federal court may abrogate a state enforcement default and replace it with a 
federal one. This Article then uses the existing literature on default rules to 
argue that the Erie doctrine itself should use default rules to force 
information from both state and federal governments about the relationship 
of default procedures to substantive policies. This way, federal courts can 
make better choices between enforcement defaults.  
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INTRODUCTION 
[T]he courts can play a useful role in forcing Congress to 
perform its constitutionally-contemplated functions. Helping 
devise such judicial Congress-prodding doctrines thus seems 
to me the most productive use that can currently be made of a 
constitutional scholar‘s time; at any rate it‘s how I‘ve been 
spending mine lately.
1
 
The Erie
2
 doctrine is notoriously difficult.
3
 Impossible to state 
succinctly and the subject of significant disagreement, the Erie doctrine 
governs, among other things, when a federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction
4
 must apply a procedure defined under state law, even if the 
procedure would conflict with a federal common law procedure.
5
 The 
doctrine is further complicated by the Rules Enabling Act, which provides 
a different standard that applies when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
defines the federal procedure.
6
 The judicial choice between state and 
federal procedure addressed by the Erie doctrine raises fundamental 
                                                                                                                     
 1. John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World 
Where Courts Are No Different From Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 878–79 (1991).  
 2. The doctrine derives its name from Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 3. As one titan in the field of civil procedure has put it, ―[n]o issue in the whole field of 
federal jurisprudence has been more difficult.‖ CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 
369 (5th ed. 1994).  
 4. See U.S. CONST. art. III § 2 (limiting the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts, 
among other things, ―to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States . . . and between a 
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects‖); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) 
(codifying and limiting the diversity jurisdiction set forth in Article III).  
 5. Admittedly, the Erie doctrine is not limited to diversity cases, but ―applies, whatever the 
ground for federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which has its source in state law.‖ RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER‘S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 563 
(6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER, 2009] (quoting Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity 
Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540–41 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956)). This Article focuses on the application of Erie to 
the choice of different procedures in diversity cases, but acknowledges the broader scope of the Erie 
doctrine from time to time. See infra Section I.C. 
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) & (b) (2006) (permitting the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of 
procedure, but only if they would not ―abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right‖); Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965) (holding that Erie does not apply to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure).  
2
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questions about the scope of federal common law power, federalism, and 
the separation of powers between federal courts and Congress.
7
 The Erie 
doctrine has been refined significantly since Erie was decided in 1938,
8
 but 
courts and scholars continue to struggle with it to this day.  
This Article addresses the Erie doctrine, and, like other scholars, I 
focus on the choice of law problem the doctrine addresses.
9
 This Article 
situates Erie among a larger class of problems—the problems associated 
                                                                                                                     
 7. As a number of scholars have noted, Erie is a ―brooding omnipresence‖ which arguably 
defines the limits of federal common law power, and thus applies to every instance of federal 
common law, including statutory interpretation. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of 
Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 901, 915 (1986) (discussing Erie in the context of 
the scope of federal common law (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting))); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1989–90 (2011) (arguing that 
state law on interpretative methods should be considered substantive state law for purposes of Erie); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) 
(―[F]ederal common law is not qualitatively different from textual interpretation, but rather is an 
extension of it . . . .‖). Since the Erie doctrine is understood to define the limits of a federal court‘s 
lawmaking power, it necessarily implicates a federal court‘s relationship to the states, as well as its 
relationship to other coordinate branches, particularly Congress. See infra Section I.C (discussing 
Erie as a constitutional doctrine). 
 8. See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467–69 (refining the ―outcome-determinative‖ test). Recent 
cases include Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 
(2010) (addressing an Erie and Rules Enabling Act challenge to a class action of state law claims 
certified under Rule 23) and Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 418–19 (1996) 
(reviewing conflict between a state law procedure for reviewing the excessiveness of a damage 
award and the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment). Some scholars, however, have 
questioned the significance of these more recent decisions. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, The 
Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 990 (2011) (arguing that Shady 
Grove ―does little to move the Erie doctrine‖); cf. Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, 
Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 19–20 (2010) 
(arguing that the Court missed an opportunity to refine the Rules Enabling Act in light of the 
policies that underlie Rule 23 and the class action).  
 9. The seminal article on Erie has argued that it is a ―myth,‖ albeit an ―irrepressible‖ one, 
insofar as the Erie problem arises from an ―indiscriminate admixture of all questions respecting 
choices between federal and state law in diversity cases,‖ and that this admixture ―has served to 
make a major mystery out of what are really three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory 
and constitutional interpretation.‖ John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
693, 697–98 (1974). This Article follows the framework provided by Ely, with some refinements. 
See infra Part II. Nevertheless, this Article argues that this framework only clarifies the issues 
implicated by the choice of procedural law, which, as the Article demonstrates below, remains a 
difficult one. See infra Part III. 
The other articles that have addressed the Erie doctrine and the related Rules Enabling Act are 
legion. Aside from the articles discussed here, recent contributions include, for example, Special 
Issue, Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939 (2011) (collecting 
articles on the Erie doctrine in light of Shady Grove); Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and 
Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129 (2012) (denouncing Erie 
in a symposium about the worst Supreme Court decisions of all time). 
3
Campos: Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1576 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
with setting and altering default rules.
10
 My goal is not to solve, minimize, 
or do away with the Erie doctrine. Instead, the goal of this Article is to 
clarify the concerns that animate the Erie doctrine and suggest some 
methods for dealing with them. This Article ultimately argues that an 
improved understanding of the choice of law at the heart of the Erie 
doctrine can improve the doctrine.  
This Article first argues that the existing Erie doctrine is flawed, in 
part, because it fails to acknowledge the enforcement function of civil 
liability. Specifically, it argues that, in applying the Erie doctrine, federal 
courts have incorrectly concluded that the claim and its constitutive 
entitlements, such as the right to compensation, are substantive 
entitlements rather than procedural ones.
11
 In doing so, federal courts have 
ignored the fact that the claim is designed to protect a higher order, primary 
entitlement—the right to avoid the legal violation in the first place.  
Accordingly, this Article first argues that the current Erie doctrine 
should recognize the right to avoid the legal violation as the relevant 
substantive right, rather than procedural entitlements like the claim used to 
enforce that right. As I argue below, conceptual clarity with respect to the 
dividing line between substance and procedure further clarifies the 
differences between the ―relatively unguided Erie‖ analysis that applies to 
federal common law procedures and the analysis that applies to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.
12
 In fact, recognizing the avoidance of the legal 
violation as the substantive right permits greater use of class actions and 
similar aggregation procedures under both the Erie doctrine and the Rules 
Enabling Act. Although procedures like the class action may impair the 
right to bring a claim, this Article  argues that these procedures should be 
permitted in many cases because they would not be outcome- 
                                                                                                                     
 10. The seminal article on default rules is Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in 
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). A recent 
symposium held at Florida State University School of Law discussed the impact of the article in 
many areas of the law. Symposium, Default Rules in Private and Public Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 557 (2006). In a recent article Professor Ian Ayres discusses the role of ―altering rules,‖ or 
rules that provide ―the necessary and sufficient conditions for displacing a default legal treatment 
with some particular other legal treatment.‖ Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt Out: An Economic Theory of 
Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2036 (2012). A more precise title for this Article may be Erie 
as a Law of Altering Rules, since it focuses precisely on the conditions for displacing a state 
procedural default with a federal procedural default and vice versa. 
 11. See, e.g., Semtek Int‘l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001) 
(concluding that a Rule that would preclude a state cause of action would ―abridge, enlarge or 
modify‖ a ―substantive right‖ in violation of the Rules Enabling Act); see also infra Section II.B. 
 12. See infra Section II.C & II.D; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) 
(distinguishing the ―relatively unguided Erie‖ test under the Rules of Decision Act and the test of 
validity under the Rules Enabling Act). 
4
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determinative
13
 or otherwise abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive 
right the claim enforces.
14
 
Once the enforcement function of civil liability is acknowledged, this 
Article further argues that the Erie doctrine can be understood as governing 
a choice of enforcement defaults. In essence, the Erie doctrine governs the 
choice a federal court must make between a two default procedures—one 
federal, the other state—to enforce substantive rights.  
In fact, almost all of the law of civil procedure can be understood as a 
law of enforcement defaults.
15
 For example, many discovery rules self-
consciously set defaults that the parties can ―stipulate‖ around.16 Likewise, 
as evidenced by forum-selection clauses
17
 and arbitration clauses,
18
 parties 
can choose ex ante the procedures to resolve their disputes. Parties can 
even avoid procedures altogether through settlement.
19
  
One can also contract around procedure at a wholesale level. Federal 
and state legislatures often abrogate existing, default procedures in certain 
substantive areas of the law, most notably in the context of prison 
litigation
20
 and securities litigation.
21
 In fact, Congress can partially 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See infra Section II.D. 
 14. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1443 (2010) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (concluding that a Rule 23 class action of state law 
claims that could not be brought as a class action in state court did not violate the Rules Enabling 
Act, but only ―insofar as it allows willing plaintiffs to join their separate claims against the same 
defendants‖) (emphasis added). But see infra Sections II.B & II.C (arguing that this view is 
mistaken). 
 15. Admittedly, many scholars have recognized the default nature of procedures. However, 
most have not discussed the enforcement function of civil procedure in any detail. See Robert G. 
Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 
1333–34 nn.21–22 (2012) (citing sources). Moreover, those who have discussed the enforcement 
function of civil procedure have not discussed the use of default rules or otherwise discuss the Erie 
Doctrine. See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723 (2011). 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 29(b) (providing, with some exceptions, that ―the parties may stipulate 
that . . . other procedures governing or limiting discovery be modified‖). 
 17. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (holding that a forum-
selection clause on a cruise ticket was enforceable because of the absence of a ―bad-faith motive‖); 
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (holding that a forum-selection clause 
was enforceable because there was not a ―strong showing that it should be set aside‖). 
 18. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (providing that ―[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration‖ disputes arising out 
of the contract ―shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable‖). 
 19. But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing 
against the encouragement of settlement by existing procedural law). 
 20. See, e.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214. 
 21. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 
Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
5
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abrogate the jurisdiction of Article III courts and similar state courts, as 
with state law tort claims involving vaccines,
22
 or can entirely abrogate 
their jurisdiction, as it has in the bankruptcy context.
23
  
Accordingly, both state and federal courts can be understood as public 
options for the enforcement of substantive rights. Courts are off-the-rack, 
one-size-fits-all institutions that provide parties a default forum and a set of 
procedures for the enforcement of the parties‘ substantive entitlements. 
Parties can use contract to customize existing procedures, and state and 
federal governments can customize procedures in certain contexts to fit 
their policies. 
Although contracting around enforcement defaults is pervasive, courts 
often struggle over when, and how, to limit this practice. During its 2011-
2012 Term, the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
examined whether the Federal Arbitration Act, which expresses a 
Congressional preference for the enforcement of arbitration clauses, 
prevents California state courts from finding unconscionable certain 
consumer arbitration clauses prohibiting class action-type procedures.
24
 
The Term before that, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. 
Allstate Insurance Co., the Court addressed whether a state law prohibition 
on class actions for state law statutory damage claims prohibited the use of 
Rule 23, the federal default rule for class actions, for the same claims in 
federal court.
25
 These same difficulties arose in an earlier generation of 
cases, exemplified by Arnett v. Kennedy,
26
 in which the Court struggled 
with whether termination of a federal employee for cause required a pre-
deprivation hearing, the default established in Goldberg v. Kelly in 
interpreting the Due Process Clause.
27
  
In all of the above contexts, the Court addressed whether there were 
limits to abrogating existing enforcement defaults, regardless of whether 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011) (holding that the 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, which sets up a no-fault compensation scheme 
administered by the Court of Federal Claims, preempted state law tort claims).  
 23. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1379 (2010) 
(―Bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a debtor‘s property.‖ (quoting Tennessee 
Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004))). Admittedly, there are limitations to 
the use of Article I tribunals to abrogate Article III and state court jurisdiction. However, these 
limitations arise out of separation of powers and due process concerns which are not discussed in 
this Article.  See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (rejecting 
statutory grant of supplemental jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts for some state law claims due to 
separation of powers and due process concerns). I address some of these concerns in a separate 
article. See Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions and Justiciability (Sept. 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 24. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745–46 (2011). 
 25. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (2010). 
 26. 416 U.S. 134, 151 (1974), overruled by Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
532 (1985). 
 27. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–64 (1970). 
6
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those defaults were defined under a statute, a procedural rule, or the 
Constitution. More importantly, in all of these contexts, the Court 
struggled with the issue, which resulted in less than ideal results. AT&T v. 
Concepcion is already being mocked for its application of contract and 
statutory interpretation doctrines.
28
 Similarly, Shady Grove has been 
criticized for making the waters of Erie and the Rules Enabling Act even 
murkier.
29
 In fact, the Supreme Court overruled Arnett v. Kennedy a decade 
later because of the tortured doctrine that resulted from the decision‘s due 
process analysis.
30
  
The problem of determining how to set and alter enforcement defaults 
arises from information costs. Due to institutional limitations, federal 
courts have insufficient information to determine what defaults to set and 
when to limit (or permit) their alteration. Thus, federal courts as they are 
currently configured are doomed to make bad choices. This Article focuses 
on the special problems that arise under the Erie doctrine, where a federal 
court must choose between two competing enforcement defaults defined by 
two different governing entities—one established by federal law (either 
through common law or a Rule) and another established by state law. In the 
Erie context, a federal court has to determine the respective policies of a 
state government and the federal government before it can even begin to 
assess the substantive impact of the choice of default procedure on those 
policies. 
This Article argues that federal courts can avoid the information costs 
that arise in the Erie context to a large extent by shifting those costs back 
to state and federal governments. In other words, a federal court can avoid 
the costs of choosing enforcement defaults by using default rules 
themselves to force state governments and the federal government to reveal 
relevant information about the relationship between the default procedure 
and the substantive right. Indeed, the information-forcing effect of such 
default rules can be found in a variety of contexts, most notably in the use 
of liability rules themselves to give parties ―options‖ to reveal information 
about their preferences for conflicting entitlements.
31
  
                                                                                                                     
 28. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric versus Reality in Arbitration 
Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
129, 144–45 (2012). 
 29. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 8, at 20 (―Shady Grove called for a restrained and 
enlightened interpretation of both the Enabling Act and Rule 23, but the Justices did not deliver.‖). 
 30. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 540–41 (rejecting then-Justice Rehnquist‘s plurality opinion 
in Arnett v. Kennedy and stating that ―[i]f a clearer holding is needed, we provide it today‖). 
 31. Indeed, one can see liability rules as providing divided entitlements. A plaintiff is 
assigned the initial entitlement, but the defendant has, in effect, a call option to take the entitlement 
from plaintiffs when the defendant values it more, with the exercise price usually set at the damages 
caused by the taking. See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 
(2005) (arguing that liability rules create options that force the parties to reveal their valuations of 
conflicting entitlements); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: 
7
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For example, if a federal court is unsure whether a state procedure is 
―bound up‖ in a substantive right, it can condition applicability of the state 
procedure on a statement that the procedure is, in fact, ―bound up‖ in the 
right.
32
 Such a default rule would effectively require a ―clear and manifest‖ 
statement of the substantive importance of the procedure.
33
 Likewise, 
because of the Supremacy Clause, Congress can reveal its preferences and 
abrogate a state law default by passing a statute.
34
 The Rules Enabling Act, 
in fact, provides a mechanism by which Congress, through its oversight of 
the Rules Advisory Committee, can speak without incurring the transaction 
costs of passing legislation.  
By forcing a dialogue between states and Congress, federal courts can 
shift the information costs associated with determining the substantive 
justification (if any) for a procedure and the procedure‘s substantive 
impact. Indeed, and counterintuitively, it may actually be better for federal 
courts to articulate bright-line, seemingly arbitrary default rules to facilitate 
the forcing of information. These rules, in isolation, may lead to 
suboptimal results, and most likely would not reflect what Congress and 
state legislatures would have chosen ex ante. However, like ―penalty 
defaults,‖ such rules would induce legislatures to reveal relevant 
information concerning the substantive justification and impact of a 
procedure.
35
  
This Article finally suggests that federal courts should reduce, rather 
than shift, the information costs associated with setting and altering 
enforcement defaults by improving the courts‘ capacity to collect and use 
relevant information. The Article suggests a number of institutional 
reforms, most notably a body within the judiciary that provides cost-benefit 
analysis of different procedures, to allow judges to make more informed 
                                                                                                                     
An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725 (1996) (noting that ―the virtue of the liability 
rule is that it allows the state to harness the information that the injurer naturally possesses about his 
prevention cost‖); cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1406–07 
(2005) (arguing that options can be used to reveal information about subjective valuation 
preferences). 
 32. See infra Section III.C; see also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 
(1958) (emphasizing that a federal court must determine whether a state procedure ―is bound up 
with [substantive] rights and obligations in such a way that its application in the federal court is 
required‖). 
 33. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (noting that, in the preemption context, 
the Court ―start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress‖ (quoting 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))). 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (―This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.‖). 
 35. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 97 (defining ―penalty defaults‖ as defaults that 
would not reflect what the parties would have wanted, but would ―encourage the production of 
information‖).  
8
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 6 [2012], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss6/4
2012] ERIE AS A CHOICE OF ENFORCEMENT DEFAULTS 1581 
 
decisions in cases involving the Erie doctrine (and, arguably, other issues 
that implicate federal jurisdiction). The Article also addresses concerns 
about the legitimacy of the courts in engaging in such policy making, and 
argues that any such objections are not well-founded. As argued below, 
such judicial intervention is not only supported by the text and structure of 
the Constitution, but may be necessary when political institutions 
malfunction.
36
 
The Article has three Parts. Part I provides background on the Erie 
doctrine and the choice of law problem it addresses. Part II discusses the 
distinction between substance and procedure, and argues for a common 
sense approach that takes the enforcement objectives of civil liability into 
account. Part III discusses the difficulty of setting and altering defaults in 
the Erie context, and argues that these difficulties can be avoided by either 
shifting or reducing information costs.  
I.  ERIE 
A.  The Erie Case 
The Erie doctrine is hard enough as it is, so it is worth discussing in 
some detail. The Erie doctrine arose from Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, a 
case in which the plaintiff, Harry Tompkins, was walking parallel to a 
moving train when his right arm was severed by the open door of a freight 
car.
37
 The freight car was operated by the defendant, the Erie Railroad 
Company, which was incorporated in New York.
38
 The accident occurred 
in Hughestown, Pennsylvania, and the parties did not dispute that 
Pennsylvania state law would apply to the case.
39
  
The case, however, was complicated by the strategic opportunities 
provided by Swift v. Tyson.
40
 Swift concerned the Rules of Decision Act, 
which essentially provided, then, as now, that: 
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution 
or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decisions in civil actions in the courts of 
the United States, in cases where they apply.
41
 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See infra Section III.C; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 102–03 
(1980) (defending an ―antitrust‖ conception of judicial review that permits judicial intervention 
when political ―markets‖ malfunction). 
 37. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of 
Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL 
PROCEDURE STORIES 21, 37–38 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
 38. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69. 
 39. Id. at 69–70. 
 40. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).  
 41. 28 U.S.C. § 1652. The Rules of Decision Act was enacted as § 34 of the Federal Judiciary 
Act of 1789, and was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 725 when Erie was decided. At the time the Act 
9
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The Swift Court, in an opinion by Justice Joseph Story, concluded that the 
Act did not include common law precedent by state courts within the ―laws 
of the several states,‖ except for precedents involving ―strictly local‖ 
matters.
42
 Under Swift, Tompkins could avoid Pennsylvania common law, 
which required Tompkins to show that the railroad committed ―wanton or 
willful‖ negligence, by filing the action in New York federal court under 
diversity jurisdiction, where federal common law only required a showing 
of ordinary negligence.
43
 Tompkins did just that, and after trial the jury 
returned a verdict in his favor. 
The Erie Court reversed, and in doing so, rejected ―the oft-challenged 
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.‖44 The Court, in the last opinion by Justice 
Louis Brandeis, initially emphasized that the Swift rule led to forum 
shopping, which, in the Court‘s view, raised equal protection concerns.45 In 
particular, the Court noted that nonresidents like Tompkins could 
strategically avail themselves of federal courts when they found federal 
common law more favorable.
46
  
But this ―equal protection‖ concern was, at best, a ―metaphor.‖47 One 
could imagine a rational basis for the Swift rule, as ―fight[ing] bias against 
out-of-staters by giving them access to a body of law . . . developed by 
persons beholden to no particular state.‖48 Moreover, the disparate impact 
of the Swift rule on residents is not as significant as the Erie Court 
                                                                                                                     
referred to ―statutes of the United States‖ rather than ―Acts of Congress,‖ and also stated that the 
Act ―shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1940) (emphasis added). The differences are 
not material to this discussion. 
 42. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18 (―In all the various cases which have hitherto come before us for 
decision, this Court have uniformly supposed, that the true interpretation of the [Rules of Decision 
Act] limited its application to state laws strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the 
state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things 
having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable 
and intraterritorial in their nature and character.‖).  
 43. Erie, 304 U.S. at 70. 
 44. Id. at 69. 
 45. Id. at 75. The Court actually began by citing a law review article by legal historian 
Charles Warren, who reviewed the legislative history of the Rules of Decision Act and argued that 
Congress intended ―laws of the several states‖ to include state court common law. See id. at 72–73 
& n.5 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 
HARV. L. REV. 49, 84–88 (1923)). Recent scholars, however, have cast doubt on Warren‘s analysis. 
See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4502, at 13–14 & n.30 (2d ed. 1996) (citing sources). The Court also discussed the 
criticism surrounding Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 
(1928), where a corporation reincorporated in a different state to take advantage of more favorable 
federal common law. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 & n.6. 
 46. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–75.  
 47. Ely, supra note 9, at 712–13. 
 48. Id.; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (holding that 
statutes that discriminatorily impact an unprotected class are subject to rational basis review). 
10
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suggested.
49
 Finally, the more one equalizes the parties, the more ―one 
deviates from the rationale of diversity jurisdiction,‖ which is, in fact, to 
discriminate in favor of nonresidents by giving them an unbiased forum.
50
 
The Erie Court, in fact, prefaced its equal protection analysis by 
acknowledging that ―[d]iversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in 
order to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those 
not citizens of the state.‖51  
The concern with forum shopping can be understood, in part, as a 
requirement of the Rules of Decision Act.
52
 In contrast to Swift, the Erie 
Court interpreted the Act as requiring a federal court to use the ―rules of 
decision‖ of a state, including state common law, which would have 
applied had the plaintiff brought the action in state court. In other words, 
the Erie Court interpreted the Act as requiring ―vertical uniformity‖ 
between a state court and a federal court sitting in diversity, as opposed to 
the ―horizontal uniformity‖ among federal courts that the Swift rule 
produced.
53
 Accordingly, applying the Swift rule when the Act required the 
application of state ―rules of decision‖ would have resulted in ―the 
unfairness of subjecting a person involved in litigation with a citizen of a 
different state to a body of law different from that which applies when his 
next door neighbor is involved in similar litigation with a cocitizen.‖54 
                                                                                                                     
 49. Specifically, the resident plaintiffs can equally avail themselves of Swift if the defendant 
is a nonresident. Admittedly, nonresident defendants can, with some restrictions, avail themselves 
of federal court when federal common law is more favorable, while resident defendants cannot. 
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006) (prohibiting the removal of any action based on diversity 
jurisdiction ―more than 1 year after commencement of the action‖), with 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) 
(2006) (removal of action based on diversity jurisdiction only permitted ―if none of the parties in 
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is 
brought‖). However, it is unlikely that this disparity would lead to a structural bias in favor of 
nonresident defendants, particularly given the availability of governing law and forum-selection 
clauses. See Ely, supra note 9, at 712–13 (arguing that the unfairness caused by the Swift rule 
concerned more than ―the vicissitudes of the removal provisions‖); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, 
Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (holding that a forum-selection clause on a cruise ticket was 
enforceable); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481–82 (1985) (interpreting the 
governing law clause in a diversity action as evidence of the ―purposeful availment‖ necessary to 
confer personal jurisdiction). 
 50. Ely, supra note 9, at 712 n.111; see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1188 
(2010) (noting that ―diversity jurisdiction‘s basic rationale‖ is to ―open[] the federal courts‘ doors to 
those who might otherwise suffer from local prejudice against out-of-state parties‖). 
 51. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. 
 52. Ely, supra note 9, at 713. 
 53. Id. at 714 n.125. 
 54. Id. at 712; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (―The Erie rule is rooted 
in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to 
differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court.‖). 
11
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B.  The Erie Doctrine 
The current Erie doctrine ensures the Rules of Decision Act‘s 
requirement of vertical uniformity by prohibiting federal common law 
procedures that differ so substantially from the procedure that would apply 
in state court that they are ―outcome-determinative.‖55 The basic idea is 
that the choice of procedure can so affect the outcome of a case as to be a 
―rule of decision‖ under the Act.56 The Court initially interpreted the 
outcome-determinative test as requiring virtually all state procedures to 
apply in a given case.
57
 After all, if the parties are arguing over the choice 
of a federal procedure or a state procedure, then the choice obviously has 
some impact on the outcome.
58
 The outcome-determinative test was later 
tempered in Hanna v. Plumer, where the Court recast the test as 
determining whether the choice of procedure would cause ―forum 
shopping‖ in other cases or otherwise lead to the ―inequitable 
administration of the laws.‖59 
The Court has also tempered the outcome-determinative test by 
permitting courts to consider federal ―affirmative countervailing 
considerations.‖60 For example, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical 
Cooperative, the Court upheld the use of a jury to determine the factual 
issue of employment, even though state law required the issue to be 
decided by a judge.
61
 The Byrd Court upheld federal jury fact-finding over 
state judge fact-finding in part because the differences were only 
marginally outcome-determinative, especially given the role of federal 
judges in reviewing jury determinations.
62
 But the Byrd Court also 
concluded that the Seventh Amendment, which protects a right to a trial by 
                                                                                                                     
 55. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 (discussing and refining the ―‗outcome determination‘ test‖). 
 56. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.) (―In essence, 
the intent of [the Erie] decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising 
jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation 
in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of 
a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.‖) (emphasis added); Ely, supra note 9, at 714 
(noting that the test is whether application of the federal procedure would not be ―materially more 
or less difficult . . . nor likely to generate an outcome different from that which would result were 
the case litigated in the state court system and the state rules followed‖) (citations omitted). 
 57. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Ragan v. Merchs. 
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 
541 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). 
 58. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
 59. Id. (―The ‗outcome-determination‘ test therefore cannot be read without reference to the 
twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.‖); see also Semtek Int‘l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 
503–04 (2001) (applying a modified ―outcome-determinative‖ test in interpreting the scope of Rule 
41(b)). 
 60. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).  
 61. Id. at 533–38.  
 62. Id. at 539–40. 
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jury in certain cases, reflects a ―strong federal policy‖ in favor of jury fact-
finding, which further justified the use of the federal procedure.
63
  
The Court would again resort to federal ―countervailing affirmative 
interests‖ to support a federal procedure in Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities.
64
 There, the Court again pointed to the Seventh Amendment, 
this time the Reexamination Clause, to limit the application of a New York 
state procedure for judicial review of large jury awards for excessiveness.
65
 
Based on the above, Erie can be understood as a case of statutory 
interpretation. The Erie Court interpreted the Rules of Decision Act to 
require vertical uniformity with respect to the ―rules of decisions‖ that 
apply to the adjudication of a state law claim, regardless of whether the 
claim is brought in state court or in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court has since interpreted Erie as providing a 
limited outcome-determinative test for determining when a conflict 
between state and federal procedure is so great that applying the federal 
procedure would, in effect, change the state law ―rule of decision.‖ Finally, 
Erie allows a court to consider federal ―countervailing affirmative 
interests‖ in support of a federal procedure separate and apart from the 
Rules of Decision Act‘s interest in maintaining vertical uniformity between 
state and federal courts.
66
 
C.  Erie and the Constitution 
But Erie did more than quibble with Swift over the proper 
interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act. The Court emphasized that the 
Constitution mandated its holding. In Swift, the Court had previously 
concluded that, with respect to ―general law,‖ the Court had the power ―to 
express [its] own opinion of the true result of the commercial law upon the 
question now before [it].‖67 In contrast, the Erie Court pointed out that the 
Constitution does not authorize courts to create a ―federal general common 
law‖ as to all matters.68 Thus, the Swift Court erred in supplanting state law 
without identifying any basis in the Constitution for expressing its own 
opinion.
69
  
Arguably the Erie Court went further and held that the federal 
government had no power to regulate (either directly through legislation or 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Id. at 537. The Court did not consider whether the Seventh Amendment did, in fact, apply 
in that case. Id. at 537 n.10. 
 64. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431–32 (1996). 
 65. Id. at 438. The Court, in particular, concluded that a district court could review a jury 
award that deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation, but, unlike the state 
practice, a federal appellate court would only review the district court‘s determination for an ―abuse 
of discretion.‖ Id. at 438. 
 66. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.  
 67. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842). 
 68. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938).  
 69. Id. at 79–80.  
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by authorizing common law) interstate disputes like the Erie case itself. 
However, ―it seems fair to infer‖ that the Court ―meant that Congress [and 
therefore the federal government] had no power to adopt a code of laws 
governing wholly intrastate questions of contract or tort which would be 
binding upon the federal and state courts alike.‖70 Understood in this way, 
Erie is an offshoot of the general rule that the federal government‘s powers 
are limited under the Constitution and that all residual powers reside with 
the states.
71
 Consequently, in the Court‘s view, federal courts cannot create 
the system of horizontal uniformity contemplated by Swift because ―the 
founders of our Republic—by not including any such power in the 
Constitution, and even more clearly by enacting the Rules of Decision 
Act—refused to do it.‖72  
For the Erie Court, Swift may have been an easy case of a court 
assuming a power of ―federal general common law‖ at odds with the 
system of limited powers that the Constitution affords the federal 
government. The harder issue is the proper scope of the judicial common 
law power even in nondiversity cases.
73
 This common law power is 
probably the most controversial aspect of a federal court‘s ―judicial power‖ 
because, unlike the enumerated powers of Congress or the President, the 
―judicial power‖ is only restricted to the jurisdictional limitations 
contained in Article III. Indeed, one possibility that Erie foreclosed, 
perhaps unjustifiably,
74
 is that the ―judicial power‖ includes a power to 
create ―federal general common law‖ as an implication of the 
Constitution‘s grant of diversity jurisdiction.75 
                                                                                                                     
 70. Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 427, 445 (1958) 
(emphasis added). 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. X (―The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.‖). Accordingly, one should not understand Erie as concerned with encroaching on an 
―enclave‖ of state power. Instead, the concern is with overreach by the federal government, which, 
by implication, would invade each state‘s residual powers. See Ely, supra note 9, at 702–04 (―The 
prior interpretation was unconstitutional, but not because the federal common law rules that had 
been developed under it were encroaching on areas of ‗state substantive law‘ or ‗state law 
governing primary private activity‘ . . . . It was unconstitutional because nothing in the Constitution 
provided the central government with a general lawmaking authority of the sort the Court had been 
exercising under Swift.‖).  
 72. Ely, supra note 9, at 713.  
 73. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 563 (noting that Erie applies in federal question 
and other cases); see also Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat‘l Bank, 306 U.S. 103, 107 (1939) 
(holding that Erie applies to state law issues in federal question cases).  
 74. See Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of 
All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 133 (2011) (arguing that the Court‘s constitutional interpretation in 
Erie was wrong on all levels). 
 75. Field, supra note 7, at 915 (noting that Erie ―clearly rejected‖ the possibility that ―courts 
can make federal common law whenever they have jurisdiction‖). 
14
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As an initial matter, and as suggested by Professor Ely, one could 
simply ignore the constitutional issue since the Rules of Decision Act is at 
least as, if not ―significantly more[,] protective of the prerogatives of state 
law.‖76 But that leaves open the possibility that the Court‘s judicial power 
could be at least as expansive as Congress‘s enumerated powers under the 
Constitution. Erie itself supported this suggestion by noting that, under 
Swift, ―[t]he federal courts assumed, in the broad field of ‗general law,‘ the 
power to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly 
without power to enact as statutes.‖77 Many scholars oppose such an 
expansive view of judicial power.
78
 Professor Paul Mishkin, in particular, 
argued for a more limited scope because ―[p]rinciples related to separation 
of powers impose an additional limit on the authority of federal courts to 
engage in lawmaking on their own (unauthorized by Congress).‖79 
The separation of powers concern that Mishkin expressed becomes 
more evident once one considers the different, ―guided‖ framework that 
applies to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
80
 In Hanna v. Plumer the 
Court concluded that, unlike federal procedures not governed by a Rule, 
the sole test for a procedure defined by a Rule is whether the Rule is 
consistent with the Rules Enabling Act and the Constitution.
81
 The Rules 
Enabling Act‘s first sentence provides: 
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general 
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases 
in the United States district courts (including proceedings 
before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.
82
 
The Act‘s second sentence further provides: ―Such rules shall not abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right.‖83 
The Court treated the Rules differently because the Rules, and the 
Enabling Act that permitted such rulemaking, were created pursuant to a 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Ely, supra note 9, at 698 (arguing that the constitutional issue ―is functionally irrelevant 
because the applicable statutes are significantly more protective of the prerogatives of state law‖). 
 77. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) (emphasis added); see also Field, 
supra note 7, at 923, 927 (noting that ―[i]n rejecting courts‘ power to act beyond the area of 
congressional competence, the Erie Court may have implied that courts can act up to the limits of 
Congress‘s power,‖ but concluding that Erie is ―ambiguous‖ on this point). 
 78. See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 1682 (1974); Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889, 892 (1974); see also 
Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1290–302 (2007); Henry 
J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 394–
98 (1964); Hill, supra note 70, at 440–41.  
 79. See Mishkin, supra note 78, at 1683 (disagreeing with Ely‘s proposition that ―courts 
would have the same range of lawmaking power as Congress‖). 
 80. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74 (1965). 
 81. Id. 
 82. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).  
 83. Id. § 2072(b). 
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―congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in 
[federal] courts.‖84 In other words, the Rules were not judge-made 
procedures that could not displace state law, but creatures of statute based 
on the exercise of a valid constitutional power that could displace state 
law. Thus, in the Court‘s view, a court can refuse to apply a Rule only 
when it ―transgresses . . . the terms of the Enabling Act‖ or ―constitutional 
restrictions.‖85 To subject such Rules to the stricter Erie analysis would 
―disembowel either the Constitution‘s grant of power over federal 
procedure or Congress‘[s] attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling 
Act.‖86   
The Rules Enabling Act highlights the separation of powers dimension 
to the scope of federal common law power. Erie concerned the 
constitutional authority of courts to displace state law. Thus, the Erie Court 
was primarily concerned with federalism. But the Rules Enabling Act, 
which Congress enacted prior to Erie in 1934, was designed to prevent 
courts from displacing congressional power beyond what Congress 
delegated through the Enabling Act. As recognized by the Court in Hanna 
v. Plumer, Congress passed the Enabling Act pursuant to its power to 
define the practices and procedures of federal courts, a power implied from 
its Article III power to create ―inferior courts.‖87 The first sentence of the 
Rules Enabling Act delegates that power to create practices and procedures 
to the Supreme Court.
88
 Given that delegation, the Rules Enabling Act 
included the second sentence to emphasize to the Supreme Court that it 
cannot enact a rule which would ―abridge, enlarge or modify any 
                                                                                                                     
 84. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. 
 85. Id. at 471. 
 86. Id. at 473–74. 
 87. See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1 (―The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.‖) (emphasis added); see also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1987) 
(―Article III of the Constitution, augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, § 8, cl. 
18, empowers Congress to establish a system of federal district and appellate courts and, impliedly, 
to establish procedural Rules governing litigation in those courts.‖).  
 88. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006); Burlington, 480 U.S. at 5 n.3 (―In the Rules Enabling Act, 
Congress authorized this Court to prescribe uniform Rules to govern the ‗practice and procedure‘ of 
the federal district courts and courts of appeals.‖). There is some question whether this delegation is 
constitutional. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., the Court, shortly after deciding Erie, concluded that 
Congress not only had ―undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts,‖ 
but ―may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules 
not inconsistent with the statutes or [C]onstitution of the United States.‖ See 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 & 
n.7 (1940) (citing cases); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 387 (1989) (citing 
Sibbach in upholding the delegation of sentencing to the Sentencing Commission). Some scholars, 
however, have questioned the constitutionality of this delegation. See MARTIN H. REDISH, 
WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION 
LAWSUIT 62–85 (2009). 
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substantive right.‖89 As noted by Professor Stephen Burbank, Congress 
designed the first two sentences of the Enabling Act ―to allocate 
lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and 
Congress.‖90 Indeed, the Enabling Act applies even in cases that are not 
based on diversity jurisdiction, presumably to prevent courts from using its 
delegated powers to legislate from the bench.
91
 
As it turns out, the line between substance and procedure defined by 
the Rules Enabling Act would not only define the relative domains of 
Congress and federal courts, but would also have the ―probable effect‖ of 
preventing the unconstitutional exercise of federal power vis-à-vis the 
states.
92
 After all, ―[t]he broad command of Erie [is] . . . identical to that of 
the Enabling Act: federal courts are to apply state substantive law and 
federal procedural law,‖ even though the lines each drew to define 
―substance‖ and ―procedure‖ materially differ.93 That ―probable effect‖ is 
undeniable because outside the boundary of the power to create federal 
procedures resides the power to enact law affecting all other substantive 
areas. As noted by Justice John Marshall Harlan in his concurrence in 
Hanna v. Plumer, it is this outer domain where Congress can exercise 
limited power under the Constitution to regulate the ―primary activity of 
citizens,‖ and states can exercise all other residual powers.94 
It is also this outer domain that formed the basis of Professor Mishkin‘s 
intuition that the scope of the judiciary‘s ―common law‖ power probably 
cannot extend as far as Congress‘s enumerated powers. In Mishkin‘s view, 
a court exercising a Congressional power ―unauthorized by Congress‖ 
would be invading the separate sphere of Congress‘s power (or, if 
Congress did not act, the state‘s residual power).95 Consequently, it is not 
enough that Congress can legislate on an issue. As evidenced by the Rules 
Enabling Act itself, Congress must also authorize the courts to assume that 
power before a court can constitutionally exercise it.  
                                                                                                                     
 89. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 
1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1107–09 (1982) (arguing that, based on a survey of the legislative 
history, the second sentence was ―surplusage‖ that ―served only to emphasize a restriction inherent 
in the use of the word ‗procedure‘ in the first sentence‖). 
 90. Burbank, supra note 89, at 1106. 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Poland, 533 F. Supp. 2d 199, 209–10 (D. Me. 2008) 
(interpreting the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure so as to comply with the second sentence of 
Rules Enabling Act). 
 92. Burbank, supra note 89, at 1106. 
 93. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965); see also Ely, supra note 9, at 718–38 
(arguing that the second sentence of the Rules Enabling Act can be interpreted as protecting state 
concerns). 
 94. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474–75 (Harlan, J., concurring) (―[Erie] recognized that the scheme 
of our Constitution envisions an allocation of law-making functions between state and federal 
legislative processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can make substantive law affecting 
state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional legislative powers in this regard.‖).  
 95. See Mishkin, supra note 78, at 1683. 
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In essence, the issue of the scope of federal common law power in 
diversity cases, what can be called the constitutional ―thread‖96 of Erie, 
arises from a gap created by the federalism and separation of powers 
features of the Constitution. The Constitution provides for diversity 
jurisdiction, with Congress assigned the power to create ―inferior courts‖ 
with that jurisdiction, and thus the implied power to promulgate the 
practices and procedures that would apply in those inferior courts. The 
laws that would apply in those courts would follow the hierarchy of laws 
under the Supremacy Clause, including any procedures that Congress 
directly legislates.
97
 As shown by the Rules Enabling Act, Congress can 
delegate some of its power to create procedures to the courts, subject to 
limitations it imposes. In some cases, Congress has provided no guidance 
on the procedure that would apply, either by legislating the procedure 
directly or by delegating limited discretion to create the procedure. In those 
situations, a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction would have to 
determine for itself the procedures that should apply consistent with 
federalism and the separation of powers. Here the only guidance would be 
the Rules of Decision Act, which, under Erie, ―is merely declarative of the 
rule which would exist in the absence of the statute.‖98 It is in this gap 
where the ―murky waters‖ of Erie reside.99 
 As noted above, the exercise of federal common law power only arises 
when gaps emerge that neither the exercise of a valid congressional power 
nor a valid state power cover. Consequently, federal common law power is 
probably best understood not as an affirmative power with precise 
contours, but as a residual power that operates only when both Congress 
and the states fail to speak to an issue.
100
 Thus, like the residual powers of 
the states protected under the Tenth Amendment, the federal common law 
power can only be defined by reference to what powers have already been 
exercised by Congress and the states. 
This may explain why, under the Erie doctrine, the outcome-
determinative test does not mandate that all state procedures apply in 
diversity actions. Instead, courts can exercise some discretion over practice 
and procedure to fill gaps in procedural law. The Constitution permits 
diversity jurisdiction and Congress has created inferior courts with that 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Id. at 1688. 
 97. Clark, supra note 78, at 1290–302 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause‘s recognition of 
the sources of law entitled to supremacy excluded federal common law). But see Field, supra note 
5, at 923–27 (arguing that the text of the Supremacy Clause does not exclude federal common law). 
 98. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) (quoting Mason v. United States, 260 
U.S. 545, 559 (1923)). 
 99. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) 
(Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion). 
 100. Field, supra note 7, at 923, 928 (concluding that, under Erie, ―[d]eciding whether 
common law can be made in any given case is a matter of interpreting each possible enabling 
authority to see whether or not it supports federal common law‖). 
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 6 [2012], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss6/4
2012] ERIE AS A CHOICE OF ENFORCEMENT DEFAULTS 1591 
 
jurisdiction.
101
 It would be anomalous if the creation of these courts did not 
entail some differences between state courts and federal courts. The whole 
point of diversity jurisdiction is to create an unbiased, and therefore 
different, forum for nonresident parties.
102
 It would also be anomalous if 
these courts could not engage in essential functions like voir dire because 
Congress had not spoken on the issue.
103
 Thus, two logical implications of 
the Congressional creation of inferior courts with diversity jurisdiction are 
that (1) the practices and procedures that apply in those courts may differ 
from state practices, and (2) those federal procedures may require 
affirmative judicial creation.  
The current Erie doctrine takes these commonsense considerations into 
account by giving courts some discretion to create practices and procedures 
so long as those procedures are not so outcome-determinative that they 
effectively displace state law. Moreover, the current Erie doctrine permits 
federal courts to consider federal ―countervailing affirmative 
considerations‖ to prevent state law from exploiting a gap. Admittedly, the 
use of such ―countervailing affirmative considerations‖ in Byrd and 
Gasperini arose from the Constitution. But one could also imagine 
situations where the federal interest is implied by features of congressional 
procedural design. One example that the Court has suggested is a federal 
common law practice of precluding state law claims that are not otherwise 
precluded under state law when it would be necessary to effectuate the 
sanctions available under the discovery provisions of the Rules.
104
 
The exercise of federal common law power to define practices and 
procedures in diversity jurisdiction is akin to the common law power 
exercised by federal courts in other contexts. For example, in the maritime 
context, the existence of federal common law power is based on the 
existence of maritime jurisdiction, the existence of ―inferior courts,‖ and 
the necessity of creating law to decide individual cases.
105
 Since, 
presumably, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over 
maritime actions, federal courts do not need to worry about displacing state 
                                                                                                                     
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (providing for diversity jurisdiction based on grant of 
jurisdiction under Article III).  
 102. Ely, supra note 9, at 712 n.111. 
 103. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 32, 33–34 (1812) (noting 
that ―[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of 
their institution,‖ but concluding ―jurisdiction of crimes against the state is not among those 
powers‖).  
 104. See Semtek Int‘l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (―If, for 
example, state law did not accord claim-preclusive effect to dismissals for willful violation of 
discovery orders, federal courts‘ interest in the integrity of its own processes might justify a 
contrary federal rule.‖). 
 105. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (―The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . of admiralty 
and maritime Jurisdiction.‖); Field, supra note 5, at 891 (noting that ―the grant of judicial power 
over ‗all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction‘ has served as the basis for judge-made 
admiralty rules‖). 
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law.
106
 Thus, in the maritime context, the absence of the federalism 
demands of Erie provides greater residual power for federal courts. In 
some cases there is greater but still incomplete congressional guidance on 
procedure, such as in cases under the Sherman Act, which defines antitrust 
violations but not much else.
107
 Because Congress ―did not intend the text 
of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of the statute or its 
application in concrete situations,‖ courts have concluded that Congress 
―expected the courts to give shape to the statute‘s broad mandate [to fill in 
the gaps] by drawing on common-law tradition.‖108 
D.  Overreach and Safeguards 
One potential problem for federal courts is determining whether there 
is, in fact, a gap that they can fill through their common law power. If a 
federal court can exercise its common law power on the basis of implied 
congressional authority and the existence of a gap, then there may be 
situations where it is uncertain whether that authorization is really implied 
such that there really is a gap. It may turn out that a gap is really a 
conclusion by Congress not to pursue a matter, and federal common law 
would be an instance not of gap-filling but of overreaching.
109
 The same 
problem may arise in determining the scope of state law, where statutory 
interpretive methods may not make clear whether the choice of procedure 
would be outcome-determinative in any given case.
110
 
There are at least two potential safeguards to overreaching through the 
exercise of federal common law power. One safeguard can be found in the 
Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause only defines the ―Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made‖ as ―the supreme 
                                                                                                                     
 106. This point is hotly disputed. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 459 (1994) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that current admiralty 
common law is ―an unwarranted assertion of judicial authority to strike down or confine state 
legislation . . . without any firm grounding in constitutional text or principle‖). 
 107. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006) (provisions defining antitrust violations); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 15(a) (2006) (provisions of the Clayton Act permitting private rights of action). 
 108. Nat‘l Soc‘y of Prof‘l Eng‘rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (discussing ―rule 
of reason‖ as arising from common law doctrine). 
 109. That may be unlikely. See Field, supra note 7, at 925 (noting that ―Courts sometimes 
decide that congressional silence‖ means that ―no federal lawmaking should exist,‖ but concluding 
that ―congressional failure to legislate in an area in its competence surely does not invariably or 
even usually carry that meaning‖); Sherry, supra note 74, at 18 (noting that ―in other arenas in 
which Congress has the last word, we do not assume that congressional silence always leaves state 
law in place or disempowers the federal courts‖). 
 110. In fact, there may be a question as to whether the interpretive methods themselves are part 
of the ―rules of decision‖ defined by state law, particularly when different methods would yield 
different outcomes. Gluck, supra note 7 (arguing that state law on interpretative methods should be 
considered substantive law for purposes of Erie). 
20
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Law of the Land.‖111 Assuming that ―the Laws of the United States‖ are 
limited to Acts of Congress, one negative implication of the Clause is that 
federal common law power cannot displace state law—an implication 
reflected by Erie‘s interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act.112 
The Supremacy Clause thus protects the powers of Congress because 
Congress can effectively abrogate federal common law through 
legislation.
113
 But one can also imagine states, either through legislation or 
precedent, making clear their own views that their state procedure is 
outcome-determinative when a federal court has decided otherwise. Again, 
a federal court must apply state law as the ―rules of decision‖ under the 
Rules of Decision Act, which, as interpreted by Erie, is reflective of the 
negative implication of the Supremacy Clause. Thus, a federal court would 
be required to interpret such law consistent with the state‘s own 
interpretation of it, which in some cases may require the certification of 
questions to a state court.
114
 
The second safeguard to judicial overreaching is the Due Process 
Clause.
115
 The Constitution outlines the procedures by which laws are 
validly enacted by the federal government and, through the Supremacy 
Clause, defines the relative hierarchy of those laws. Moreover, state laws 
are presumably subject to procedures of valid enactment under state 
constitutions. Accordingly, if federal common law power improperly 
displaces the laws that would otherwise apply, then the consequences of 
that displacement would most likely be a deprivation of ―life, liberty, or 
property‖ without ―due process of law.‖116  
Unlike the political safeguard provided by congressional or state action 
to correct an overreach, this safeguard would protect against overreaching 
through judicial review. It would permit a federal court to review whether 
the use of federal common law so undermines the processes for lawmaking 
                                                                                                                     
 111. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 112. See Clark, supra note 78, at 1303. But see Field, supra note 7, at 897 n.64 (noting that ―it 
is now settled that federal common law is ‗law‘ within the meaning of the supremacy clause,‖ citing 
Friendly, supra note 78, at 405). 
 113. This is sometimes referred to in the literature as a ―structural‖ safeguard, but the better 
term may be ―political‖ safeguard because the safeguard relies on politics influencing congressional 
action. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 869, 870 (2011) (arguing that ―political factions are particularly likely to use their structural 
veto to block jurisdiction-stripping legislation favored by their opponents‖). As an aside, 
congressional action arguably can also be used to protect state interests given the selection 
procedures of senators and representatives to Congress. See Clark, supra note 78, at 1289–90 
(making this argument).  
 114. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1995–96 (discussing scholars who advocate greater use of 
certification of legal questions to state courts). 
 115. U.S. CONST. amend. V (―No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law‖); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (―[N]or shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.‖).  
 116. Id. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.  
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outlined in the Constitution that it would violate due process. The reverse 
can also be true. One possibility would be for courts to consider whether 
existing positive law itself has run afoul of constitutionally defined 
processes (either under the federal constitution or state constitutions) so 
that following such law, rather than displacing it through common law, 
would itself be a deprivation of due process.
117
  
II.  SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 
A.  Separate Piles v. Common Sense 
For both the Erie doctrine and the Rules Enabling Act, much turns on 
whether the federal procedure falls within the federal courts‘ limited power 
to make procedural law. Consequently, when a federal common law 
procedure conflicts with the procedure that a state court would use, federal 
courts have been preoccupied with whether the federal procedure would 
displace a state procedure ―bound up with rights and obligations‖ under 
state law.
118
 Likewise, in the Rules Enabling Act context, federal courts 
have focused on whether a Rule ―really regulates procedure‖119 which 
would not otherwise ―abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive right.‖120 
But the distinction between substantive rights and procedure has caused 
significant confusion because it is unclear where substance ends and 
procedure begins. The ―hazy‖ line between substance and procedure was 
recognized by the Erie Court itself, and has been invoked repeatedly in 
subsequent cases.
121
  
One source of confusion is what Professor John Hart Ely described as 
the ―primitive‖ view that there are ―two separate piles marked ‗substance‘ 
and ‗procedure.‘‖122 Under this separate piles view, substance and 
procedure are considered mutually exclusive categories. Either a procedure 
is in the substance pile or it is not. 
Ely illustrated the separate piles view by discussing Sibbach v. 
Wilson.
123
 There, the plaintiff challenged Rule 35, which permits a party to 
                                                                                                                     
 117. Cf. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129–30 (1985) (rejecting a procedural due process 
claim under the Due Process Clause because the plaintiffs failed to allege, among other things, ―any 
defect in the legislative process‖). 
 118. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958). 
 119. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) 
(Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1940)). 
 120. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 121. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (―The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts 
federal power over procedure.‖); see also Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1450 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment) (same, citing cases).  
 122. Ely, supra note 9, at 735. 
 123. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
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compel the medical examination of another party in discovery.
124
 The 
Court concluded that, based on the first sentence of the Rules Enabling 
Act, Rule 35 was valid because it ―really regulates procedure,—the judicial 
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and 
for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of 
them.‖125 The Court, however, ignored the second sentence of the Enabling 
Act, which, by its terms, further requires a Court to determine whether any 
such procedure would ―abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.‖126  
Professor Ely surmised that the Sibbach Court‘s neglect of the second 
sentence of the Rules Enabling Act was a consequence of the separate piles 
view. Because the Court had already put Rule 35 in the ―procedure‖ pile, 
the Court‘s interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act at the time did not 
require any application of state law because federal courts had discretion to 
define procedure.
127
 Accordingly, the Sibbach Court made no effort to 
identify which procedure applied in state court, nor whether displacement 
of that state law procedure would ―abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.‖128  
Ely further noted that, had the Court concluded that Rule 35 was in the 
procedure pile but nevertheless affected substance, the second sentence of 
the Enabling Act would invalidate the Rule. But in the pre-Hanna state of 
the Erie doctrine, the Sibbach Court, having already concluded that 
medical examination procedures under Rule 35 are really procedures, 
would then have to apply federal common law under the Rules of Decision 
Act to define the appropriate examination procedure. Thus, according to 
Ely, had the Sibbach Court given effect to the second sentence of the 
Enabling Act, the Court would have only ―shift[ed] control from the 
Federal Rules to the federal courts.‖129 Rather than engage in that pointless 
exercise, the Sibbach Court simply ignored the second sentence of the 
Rules Enabling Act. 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Id. at 14; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(1) (―The court where the action is pending may 
order a party whose mental or physical condition—including a blood group—is in controversy to 
submit it to a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner‖). The 
plaintiff also challenged Rule 37, which was used to enforce Rule 35. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 8–9. 
 125. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. 
 126. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 127. Ely, supra note 9, at 736 (noting that the Sibbach Court likely concluded that ―if the 
Rules of Decision Act did not mandate application of state law, nothing did‖). Indeed, Ely would 
later debate Professor Abram Chayes over what procedure, in fact, would have applied in state court 
in Sibbach. Compare Abram Chayes, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Bead Game, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1974), with John Hart Ely, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Necklace, 
87 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1974).  
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).  
 129. Ely, supra note 9, at 737. 
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In contrast to the separate piles view, Ely argued for a common sense 
approach. Under this approach, a ―procedural rule‖ is ―one designed to 
make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the 
resolution of disputes.‖130 In contrast, a ―substantive rule‖ or ―substantive 
right‖ arises from ―those rules of law which characteristically and 
reasonably affect people‘s conduct at the stage of primary private 
activity.‖131 This common sense definition of substance includes the 
objectives of ―deterrence and compensation.‖132 It also includes other 
substantive rights unrelated to the objectives of litigation, but which may 
be undermined by litigation procedures.
133
  
Under Ely‘s common sense view, a procedure could affect substance 
yet remain in the procedure pile. A procedure, in fact, may have both 
procedural and substantive justifications. A statute of limitations, for 
example, could be promulgated because it reduces the size of the docket—
a procedural justification. The same statute of limitations could also be 
promulgated because, in some cases, it provides a ―feeling of release‖ 
deemed important outside the confines of litigation, which would be a 
substantive justification.
134
  
Accordingly, Professor Ely argued that the second sentence of the 
Enabling Act requires an additional step beyond the identification of a 
procedure as ―really regulat[ing] procedure.‖135 It would require a federal 
court to determine whether that procedure would otherwise ―abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right‖ based upon a review of the 
justifications for the procedure.
136
 If the procedure lacked any substantive 
justification, then it would not run afoul of the second sentence of the 
Enabling Act.
137
 But if it did have a substantive justification, among others, 
then it would violate the Enabling Act. In Ely‘s view, this second inquiry 
was harder, but ―not a great deal harder.‖138  
Although others have proposed the common sense view of 
―substance,‖139 the Court has never embraced it explicitly.140 The Court, 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Id. at 724. 
 131. Id. at 725 (1974) (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 678 (1953) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER, 1953]). 
 132. Id. at 726. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (discussing statutes of limitations). 
 135. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (discussing the first sentence of the Enabling 
Act). 
 136. See Ely, supra note 9, at 727–28. 
 137. Id. at 732–33 (discussing ―door-closing‖ rules like statute of limitations). 
 138. Id. at 728. 
 139. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 665–66 (discussing the views of Henry Hart); 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474–75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (―[Erie] recognized that the 
scheme of our Constitution envisions an allocation of law-making functions between state and 
federal legislative processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can make substantive law 
affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional legislative powers in this regard.‖). 
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however, has rejected the separate piles view, and one plausible inference 
from that rejection is an acceptance of the common sense approach. For 
example, all of the Justices on the current Court recently acknowledged in 
Shady Grove that ―procedural rules‖ can ―affect[] a litigant‘s substantive 
rights,‖ strongly suggesting, consistent with the common sense approach, 
that a procedure can affect substance without losing its procedural 
character.
141
  
The Court‘s implicit acceptance of the common sense approach is 
understandable. Most obviously, the common sense approach gives 
meaning to the second sentence of the Rules Enabling Act. But more 
importantly, the common sense approach better accords with the purpose 
of the Rules Enabling Act, which was to delegate congressional lawmaking 
power over the litigation process, but not over other areas of the law.  
Despite the Court‘s rejection of the separate piles view, vestiges of it 
surface from time to time. Take, for example, Justice John Paul Stevens‘s 
concurrence in Shady Grove. There, the plaintiffs sought to certify claims 
under New York insurance law, which provided a statutory penalty for 
failure to pay insurance benefits on time.
142
 The statutory penalty, defined 
as 2% interest per month, was larger than the actual damages which 
accrued from the late payment—approximately $500 for all of the 
plaintiffs.
143
 The proposed class action further ―transform[ed] [the] dispute 
over a five hundred dollar penalty into a dispute over a five million dollar 
penalty.‖144 A majority, including Justice Stevens, concluded that Rule 23 
permitted a federal court to certify New York state law claims for statutory 
interest even though a state law, New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 
section 901(b), prohibited class actions for all statutory damage claims.
145
  
The Court unanimously concluded that Rule 23 satisfied the first 
sentence of the Rules Enabling Act because, following Sibbach, Rule 23 
                                                                                                                     
 140. See Ely, supra note 9, at 697 (―But the Supreme Court is the Supreme Court, and seven is 
a majority of nine even when Justice Harlan is one of the two. Hanna therefore may not be Erie, but 
it seems to be the law.‖); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic 
Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1940 (2006) (noting that ―Justice 
Harlan was writing only for himself in his plea for a Hartian vision of Erie in Hanna v. Plumer‖). 
 141. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1442 (2010) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (―The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant‘s 
substantive rights; most procedural rules do.‖); id. at 1455, 1459 n.18 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment); id. at 1471–72 n.13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J.) (citing N.Y. INS. LAW ANN. § 5106(a)). 
 143. Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. at 1443 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (second alteration in original) (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 145. Id. at 1437 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. ANN. § 901); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. ANN. § 901(b) 
(―Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically 
authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum 
measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.‖). 
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―really regulates procedure.‖146 Indeed, although they disagreed on the 
result, both Justice Antonin Scalia‘s plurality and Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg‘s dissent concluded that, under Sibbach, satisfying the first 
sentence of the Enabling Act was sufficient to establish the validity of Rule 
23.
147
  
In contrast to both Justice Scalia‘s plurality and Justice Ginsburg‘s 
dissent, Justice Stevens further concluded that the Enabling Act requires a 
separate inquiry as to whether Rule 23 would otherwise ―abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right.‖148 Based on this separate inquiry, Justice 
Stevens concluded that the purposes of section 901(b), as revealed by its 
text and its legislative history, do ―not clearly describe a judgment that 
section 901(b) would operate as a limitation on New York‘s statutory 
damages.‖149 After reviewing the legislative history, Stevens observed that 
the history supported two competing narratives. The first narrative viewed 
section 901(b) as preventing ―excessive penalties.‖150 The second narrative 
understood section 901(b) as a conclusion that there was ―no need to 
permit class actions in order to encourage litigation‖ when statutory 
damages were involved.
151
 Because Justice Stevens viewed the second 
narrative as procedural, he found that these ―two plausible competing 
narratives‖ made it ambiguous whether section 901(b) was substantive, and 
thus applied Rule 23 given that section 901(b)‘s text was, on its face, 
procedural.
152
 
                                                                                                                     
 146. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1940). 
 147. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (―We have held since 
Sibbach, and reaffirmed repeatedly, that the validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon 
whether it regulates procedure.‖). Justice Ginsburg‘s agreement is implied from the fact that she 
interpreted Rule 23 so as not to be procedural, out of fear that it would apply because it really 
―regulates procedure.‖ Id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court must avoid 
―immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would trench on state prerogatives without 
serving any countervailing interest‖); see also Clermont, supra note 8, at 1015 (arguing that ―[t]he 
dissent, by Justice Ginsburg for Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, signified assent to the 
plurality‘s understanding of Sibbach mainly by silence‖). 
 148. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1451–52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)). Despite his position in Shady Grove, Justice 
Scalia, like Justice Stevens, also agrees that a separate inquiry is required as to whether a Rule 
would otherwise ―abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,‖ but, as discussed below, his 
conception of what constitutes a ―substantive right‖ is quite limited. See infra Part II.B. Moreover, 
Justice Ginsburg implicitly agrees with a separate inquiry as to the substantive impact of the 
procedure, but subsumes this inquiry into the interpretation of the Rule. I reject that approach later 
in this Article. See infra Section III.C. 
 149. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1451–52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). He also concluded that the text of section 901(b) was ambiguous because it applied to 
all claims, not just claims under New York law. Id. at 1457–58. 
 150. Id. at 1458. 
 151. Id. at 1458. 
 152. Id. at 1459–60. 
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Although, in his concurrence, Justice Stevens explicitly rejects the 
separate piles view, he neglects the fact that a procedure can have both 
procedural and substantive justifications. There was no need for Justice 
Stevens to frame the justifications as competing narratives, since, as Ely 
pointed out, a procedure can have multiple justifications.
153
 In fact, under 
the common sense approach, only one of the competing narratives has to 
be substantive in order for a Rule to violate the second sentence of the 
Enabling Act, and certainly that was the case in Shady Grove.
154
 Thus, 
Justice Stevens, in rejecting the separate piles view, adheres to it by 
searching for the correct pile to assign section 901(b). 
As evidenced by Justice Stevens‘s difficulty in parsing the legislative 
history of section 901(b), a state may fail to articulate clearly its 
substantive rationale for a procedure. A federal court therefore could 
exploit any such ambiguity to displace state law procedures with federal 
ones. Conversely, a state may strategically provide a substantive 
justification for a procedure even though the procedure bears little or no 
relation to that justification. 
Consequently, Ely‘s common sense view of the distinction between 
substance and procedure is flawed. He focuses solely on the stated 
substantive justifications for a procedure and ignores the actual substantive 
impact a procedure has apart from those justifications.
155
 A better common 
sense approach would take into account both the substantive justification 
for a procedure and its actual substantive impact to prevent opportunistic 
behavior by both federal courts and state courts.  
B.  Avoiding the Wrong as the Substantive Right 
Professor Ely‘s reference to deterrence and compensation as matters of 
substance reveals another primitive view that continues to pervade the Erie 
doctrine. Courts and scholars have generally agreed that the ―substantive 
right,‖ at least for purposes of the Rules Enabling Act, should be 
understood as the claim and its constitutive entitlements, such as the right 
to control the claim or the right to compensation.
156
 As a result, the claim 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Ely, supra note 9, at 732–33. 
 154. Id. at 732–33 (discussing ―door-closing‖ rules like statutes of limitations). 
 155. Ely, supra note 9, at 724 n.170 (arguing that ―[t]he test suggested is geared to the 
purposes underlying the state rule and not to whether the rule ‗in fact‘ serves substantive or 
procedural ends,‖ since, in his view, a full blown ―‗effects test‘ would seem destined either to 
unintelligibility or to the invalidation of every Federal Rule thereby rendering the Enabling Act 
entirely self-defeating‖). Although I agree that an ―effects test‖ would be difficult to administer, I 
disagree that an ―effects test‖ would either be ―unintelligib[le]‖ or ―self-defeating.‖ See infra 
Sections III.B & III.D. Nevertheless, this Article later provides a partial defense to Ely‘s approach. 
See infra Section III.C. 
 156. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006); see also Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1092–93 (2012) (discussing the ―bundle‖ of entitlements that comprise the 
claim, such as the right to control and the right to compensation). 
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cannot be ―abridge[d], enlarge[d], or modif[ied]‖ under the Rules Enabling 
Act.
157
  
In Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., for example, 
the Court addressed whether Rule 41(b), which governs involuntary 
dismissals, permitted a federal court to preclude a state law claim for 
failing to comply with the statute of limitations defined under California 
state law.
158
 If Rule 41(b) permitted the district court to preclude the claim, 
the Rule could have conflicted with California state law if California law 
permitted a claim to be brought in another forum with a longer statute of 
limitations, in that case Maryland.
159
 But the Court interpreted Rule 41(b) 
only to bar the plaintiff from bringing the same claim again in the same 
federal court.
160
 According to the Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice 
Scalia, ―if California law left petitioner free to sue on this claim in 
Maryland even after the California statute of limitations had expired, the 
federal court‘s extinguishment of that right (through Rule 41(b)‘s 
mandated claim-preclusive effect of its judgment) would seem to violate‖ 
the second sentence of the Rules Enabling Act.
161
 Here the Court expressly 
identified the relevant ―right‖ as the claim. 
For support, the Semtek Court cited Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., in 
which the Court invalidated a settlement class action under Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) of state law asbestos claims.
162
 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) permits 
mandatory class actions, understood as class actions that do not allow a 
plaintiff to exit the class to file her claim separately.
163
 Moreover, Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) class actions typically apply to ―limited fund‖ situations where 
the Court distributes any recovery on a pro rata basis.
164
 The Court, in an 
opinion by Justice David Souter, invalidated the class action in part 
because of Rules Enabling Act concerns.
165
 The Court highlighted ―the 
tension between the limited fund class action‘s pro rata distribution in 
equity and the rights of individual tort victims at law.‖166 Here the 
substantive ―rights of the tort victims at law‖ included the right to not only 
                                                                                                                     
 157. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 158. 531 U.S. 497 (2001); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (―Unless the dismissal order states 
otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule . . . operates 
as an adjudication on the merits.‖) (emphasis added). 
 159. Id. at 503. The Court did not address whether the district court‘s application of Rule 41(b) 
conflicted with California preclusion law. See id. at 503–04.  
 160. Id. at 506. 
 161. Id. at 503–04 (emphasis added). 
 162. 527 U.S. 815, 864–65 (1999). 
 163. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B); id. 23(c)(2)(A) (providing that for class actions certified 
under Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2), ―the court may‖—not shall—―direct appropriate notice to the 
class,‖ and failing to require a means of opting out of the class). 
 164. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 834–35 (discussing historical origins of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)). 
 165. Id. at 845. 
 166. Id. 
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bring the claim individually, but to seek the unconstrained individualized 
damages that come with an individually filed claim. 
Justice Scalia, following Semtek and Ortiz, would return to the 
conception of the claim as a substantive right in Shady Grove. Again, 
Shady Grove concerned whether a New York state law, section 901(b), 
which prohibited class actions for claims seeking state statutory damages, 
prevented a federal court from certifying the same class under Rule 23.
167
 
Writing for a plurality, Justice Scalia concluded that Rule 23 could do so 
without violating the Rules Enabling Act, ―at least insofar as [the Rule] 
allows willing plaintiffs to join their separate claims against the same 
defendants in a class action.‖168 As in Semtek and Ortiz, the Court 
suggested that an involuntary taking of the claim through a class action 
would run afoul of the second sentence of the Rules Enabling Act.
169
  
In sum, the current Court has defined an enclave of substantive law in 
which the Court takes the second sentence of the Enabling Act seriously. In 
the Court‘s view, the second sentence of the Rules Enabling Act defines 
the claim and its constitutive entitlements as the relevant ―substantive 
right‖ which a Rule cannot ―abridge, enlarge or modify.‖170 Indeed, 
although the legislative history as to what constitutes a ―substantive right‖ 
under the Enabling Act is far from clear,
171
 the first Advisory Committee 
concluded that the Rules cannot extinguish or otherwise limit the claim, 
such as by defining ―the effect of judgments on persons who are not 
parties.‖172 
                                                                                                                     
 167. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 168. Id. at 1443 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); see also Adam N. Steinman, 
Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1131, 1164 (2011) (highlighting this caveat and its relationship to Justice Scalia‘s position 
in Semtek). 
 169. See Campos, supra note 155, at 1076–78 (arguing that the class action is a judicial 
assignment of the legal title and a partial beneficial interest of the plaintiff‘s claims to the class 
action attorney). This focus on the claim as the relevant substantive right has extended to individual 
defenses, which can be understood as the defendant‘s version of the claim. Cf. Campos, supra note 
156, at 189 n.148 (noting that the Due Process Clause applies to both claims and individual 
defenses). In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, for example, the Court rejected a proposed federal 
procedure to distribute damages in a massive Title VII class action by taking a random sample of 
claims to determine the total aggregate liability of Wal-Mart. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). Justice 
Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that such a ―Trial By Formula‖ would violate the 
Rules Enabling Act because it would infringe upon the defendant‘s rights under Title VII (in this 
case a federal law) to assert statutory defenses against individual plaintiffs. Id. 
 170. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 171. See Burbank, supra note 89, at 1122–31 (noting only that main concern was to protect 
―substantive rights already recognized by the law‖); cf. Steinman, supra note 168, at 1162–64 
(noting Supreme Court precedent concluding that preclusion and statute-of-limitation periods 
would violate the Rules Enabling Act, which both would infringe upon the claim). 
 172. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 8, at 55 (noting that the Rules Advisory Committee that 
promulgated the 1938 version of Rule 23 ―consider[ed] it beyond their functions to deal with the 
question of the effect of judgments on persons who are not parties‖); see also Diane Wood 
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A number of scholars have also subscribed to the view that the claim is 
the relevant ―substantive right‖ for Rules Enabling Act purposes.173 For 
example, Professor Martin Redish has criticized small claims class actions 
in which a substantial number of plaintiffs fail to collect from the 
recovery.
174
 In his view, when a small claims class action does not 
compensate a substantial number of class members, it transforms into a 
―disguised bounty hunter action‖ that enriches the class attorney by 
assigning to him each plaintiff‘s dispositive control over the claim along 
with a cut of the recovery.
175
 In taking away the claim from the plaintiffs 
for the class attorney‘s benefit, these ―bounty hunter‖ class actions 
―effectively transform[] the essence of the pre-existing private right‖ in 
violation of the Rules Enabling Act.
176
 Professor Redish, moreover, 
contends that such ―bounty hunter‖ class actions allow courts to abrogate 
surreptitiously the compensatory function of the claim, which extends 
beyond the limited delegation of power to promulgate procedures provided 
by the Enabling Act.
177
 
                                                                                                                     
Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459, 459–60 
(discussing historical vacillation over issue of preclusion in class actions). 
 173. See, e.g., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 84 (2007) 
(arguing against the use of mandatory class actions in mass tort litigation, since the ―the delegation 
made in the [Rules Enabling] Act must stop short of the legislative power that Congress might 
wield to alter preexisting rights‖); Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
877, 880–81 (2011) (arguing that under both the Erie doctrine and the Rules Enabling Act, federal 
courts cannot ―choose a rule that affects th[e] expected value‖ of the claim). 
 174. REDISH, supra note 88, at 35–69; see also Martin H. Redish et al. Cy Pres Relief and the 
Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
617, 617 (2010). 
 175. Id. at 35; see also id. at 26–27 (analogizing such class actions to ―qui tam‖ actions in 
which a noninjured third party asserts claims belonging to the victim, although, unlike qui tam 
actions, ―class action bounty actions‖ have not ―been explicitly authorized by congressional 
statute‖). 
 176. Id. at 38 (criticizing Professor David Shapiro‘s entity view of the class action, because 
―the laws establishing‖ the claim ―vest compensatory rights not in an entity of plaintiffs but rather in 
individual victims‖); see also Campos, supra note 156, at 1076–78 (noting that the class action 
assigns dispositive control and a partial interest in the plaintiffs‘ claims to the class attorney). 
 177. REDISH, supra note 88, at 41 (―To allow a rule that purports to do nothing more than 
create a procedural mechanism to transform pre-existing private compensatory rights into a crude 
form of parens patriae action is to abuse the rules of procedure.‖).  
Professor Redish further argues against the ―paternalism‖ of the class action, which 
presupposes that the control over the plaintiffs‘ claims should be assigned to the class action 
attorney because she will make better decisions in the litigation than the plaintiffs themselves. Id. at 
40. He argues that this paternalism ―flies in the face of foundational normative premises of 
democratic theory, grounded in respect for the individual‘s ability to decide for herself what her 
best interests are.‖ Id. I disagree that a plaintiff‘s control over the claim is a ―foundational 
normative premise[] of democratic theory,‖ as I have argued elsewhere. See Campos, supra note 
156, at 1110–15.  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting here that Redish ignores other areas of the law which place 
paternalistic limits on a plaintiff‘s control over a claim. For example, a plaintiff cannot sell the 
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But defining the relative substantive right as the claim ignores the 
enforcement function of the claim. This enforcement function implies a 
further entitlement—a right to be free from the legal violation.178 Under 
tort law, for example, the claim not only compensates, but also protects the 
victim‘s entitlement to be free from the tortious conduct.179 Similarly, 
antitrust law provides for antitrust claims precisely to enforce a private 
right to be free from antitrust violations.
180
 In fact, many scholars, 
including Redish, acknowledge that the claim is a ―provision of a remedy 
or remedies by which . . . behavioral regulations are to be enforced.‖181 
It is this right to be free from violations of the law, and not the claim, 
that should be considered the relevant substantive right. This is because, 
under the common sense approach, this higher order entitlement arises 
from ―those rules of law which characteristically and reasonably affect 
people‘s conduct at the stage of primary private activity.‖182 After all, 
―[t]he rights protected by tort law are, by and large, rights against being 
mistreated in certain ways by others.‖183 This point is ―blindingly obvious‖ 
but nevertheless missed under the current Erie doctrine.
184
 Indeed, the 
plain language of the Enabling Act supports recognition and protection of 
                                                                                                                     
claim except in very limited circumstances. See id. at 1074–76 (discussing limits on the alienability 
of the claim under the law of champerty and maintenance). Moreover, a potential plaintiff often 
must pay for a claim she does not want, as when a party can purchase a car with antilock brakes, 
coupled with a right to sue for any defect, but cannot waive her right to a remedy to pay a lower 
price for the car. See CHARLES FRIED & DAVID ROSENBERG, MAKING TORT LAW: WHAT SHOULD BE 
DONE AND WHO SHOULD DO IT 53–54 (2003) (noting this paternalistic aspect of tort law). 
 178. See Campos, supra note 156, at 33–37 (noting and discussing this distinction). 
 179. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Calabresi and Melamed 
note that ―[t]he state not only has to decide whom to entitle, but it must also simultaneously make a 
series of equally difficult second order decisions. These decisions go to the manner in which 
entitlements are protected,‖ such as through liability rules that provide a cause of action for the 
damages that result from the lost entitlement. Id. at 1090–92. 
 180. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130–31 (1969) 
(―[T]he purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to 
provide private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws.‖). 
 181. REDISH, supra note 88, at 23 (recognizing that laws containing liability rules, including 
―state tort laws . . . all contain two fundamental elements: the proscription or regulation of an 
actor‘s ‗primary behavior‘ and the provision of a remedy or remedies by which these behaviorial 
regulations are to be enforced‖). 
 182. Ely, supra note 9, at 725 (quoting HART & WECHSLER, 1953, supra note 131, at 678); see 
also REDISH, supra note 88, at 23 (recognizing liability rules in all contexts as providing ―the 
proscription or regulation of an actor‘s ‗primary behavior‘‖).  
 183. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights and Responsibilities in the Law of 
Torts, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 251, 262 (D. Nolan & A. Robertson eds., 2012).  
 184. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 
976–77 (2010). 
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these ―substantive right[s],‖ even if the legislative history is ambiguous on 
this point.
185
 
Arguably whether a claim implies a primary, substantive right to avoid 
a legal violation may depend on whether, in a given context, ―deterrence is 
plausibly deemed the main goal of litigation.‖186 But deterrence (or, more 
broadly, enforcement) is the main goal of litigation in all contexts, both as 
a positive and a normative matter.  
As a positive matter, all claims are premised on a finding of liability, 
which arises from a failure to act in a certain way defined by the liability 
rule. Thus, a claim (which, after all, is a claim that your rights were 
violated) cannot be understood in the absence of a substantive right to be 
free from the underlying legal violation. More importantly, a claim, as a 
positive matter, is designed to induce a party not to violate the law. This is 
readily apparent in cases where the remedy is specific performance, since 
the claim only effectuates the substantive right to force the party to act a 
certain way. But even with claims involving substitutionary remedies like 
compensatory damages, the expected liability that arises from these claims 
also has an effect on whether the defendant engages in lawful behavior. 
The defendant, after all, can avoid or reduce its liability by following the 
law.
187
 Accordingly, as a positive matter, a claim ensures legal compliance, 
either directly or through deterrence, regardless of what function a state or 
Congress ascribes to the claim.
188
 
                                                                                                                     
 185. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) 
(―[W]hen the statute‘s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.‖ (quoting and 
paraphrasing from United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 186. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1522 n.329 (2008) (criticizing scholarship that has 
argued that deterrence is the primary function of small claims litigation); cf. REDISH, supra note 88, 
at 23 (arguing that deterrence is only an ―incidental benefit‖ of the claim, and not its primary 
function). 
 187. More precisely, a claim for substitutionary remedies like damages reflects a ―divided 
entitlement‖ in which the plaintiff has an entitlement to be free from a legal violation, with the 
defendant having an ―option‖ to take the entitlement only if he or she pays the exercise price of 
damages. See AYRES, supra note 31, at 5 (―The crucial jumping off point is to see that liability rules 
give potential takers an option to take.‖). Such an ―option‖ to take entails an underlying entitlement. 
Id. at 4–5 (noting that entitlements can include ―the right to bodily security‖ or ―the right to a 
pollution-free atmosphere‖). 
 188. Admittedly, a state (or Congress) may consider compensation the primary goal of the 
litigation, with deterrence an ―incidental‖ effect. Cf. REDISH, supra note 88, at 31 (―By seeking to 
benefit the individual litigants . . . adjudication may have the incidental impact of advancing the 
public interest.‖). However, if states identify the primary goal of the claim as compensation, then 
they have chosen a strange way to provide it. Why, for example, would a state condition 
compensation on a finding of liability rather than, for example, a finding of actual loss, unless it 
also cared about the victim‘s right to lawful behavior? Moreover, why would a state use the court 
system to compensate victims given the high costs of litigation? Finally, if states only cared about 
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As a normative matter, in most cases where the remedy is 
substitutionary, as in claims for compensatory damages, the compensation 
sought cannot fully substitute for the loss because many losses are 
nonpecuniary, or irreplaceable.
189
 Even if all of the losses are replaceable, 
any compensation provided by the claim would not cover the entire loss 
because litigation is costly and, under the American Rule, the parties bear 
their own litigation costs. Because, again, a claim, as a positive matter, 
prevents a legal violation (as in the case of specific performance actions), 
or deters the violation (as in the case of substitutionary remedies), 
individuals would always prefer the claim‘s function of avoiding the loss 
to its function of providing inherently incomplete compensation for it.
190
 
Thus, both positively and normatively, deterrence is always the main goal 
of litigation in all contexts, and should not be sacrificed for compensatory 
or other purposes. 
This is not to say that civil liability does not have a compensatory 
function, or that compensation is not otherwise important. In fact, in most 
cases, protecting the compensatory function of the claim also means 
protecting its enforcement function. Instead, the point is to show that the 
primary entitlement provided by the liability rule is the avoidance of the 
legal violation. To the extent that protection of the claim conflicts with that 
primary entitlement, then the claim and its constitutive entitlements should 
give way. 
Consider, again, Shady Grove. Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, agreed with 
the Court that Rule 23 would apply if it covered the issue, but contended 
that section 901(b) did not prohibit a class action. Instead, Justice Ginsburg 
interpreted section 901(b) to limit the remedy available in a class action 
because the Rules should be interpreted ―with awareness of, and sensitivity 
to, important state regulatory policies.‖191 Accordingly, in Justice 
Ginsburg‘s view, the Rules of Decision Act applied, and, under Erie, 
section 901(b) should apply because permitting a Rule 23 class action 
would be ―outcome affective.‖192 Specifically, a class action increased the 
potential recovery significantly, leading to obvious forum shopping.
193
  
                                                                                                                     
compensation, why not provide compensation directly, or subsidize insurance? Cf. Robert G. Bone, 
Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 329–32 (2008) 
(criticizing an approach that would focus on ―full compensation‖ divorced from other substantive 
interests). 
 189. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW § 6.4, at 133 (1987) 
(defining non-pecuniary losses as losses that are not a single good, such as wealth, or capable of 
being produced by that good); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979) (same); Lee 
Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DUKE L.J. 1285, 1290–93 (2011) (same, citing sources). 
 190. See Campos, supra note 156, at 1084–85 (discussing preference for avoidance of a risk 
over incomplete compensation for it). 
 191. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 192. Id. at 1471–72. 
 193. Id. 
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Stephen Burbank and Tobias Wolff also agree with Justice Ginsburg 
that Rule 23 is in some ―tension‖ with ―the goals of the underlying law.‖194 
While Justice Ginsburg reconceptualized section 901(b) as a law that 
places a limit on remedies, Burbank and Wolff reconceptualize Rule 23 as 
a tool to enforce ―important public norms.‖195 In particular, they contend 
that ―rigid formal categories are inadequate, even counterproductive, when 
one seeks to describe and justify the permissible bounds of a class action 
proceeding and the binding effect of a resulting judgment.‖196 Instead, 
Burbank and Wolff argue that one must ―reject[] dogmatic adherence to 
transsubstantive procedure and the allure of artificially crisp formalisms, 
recognizing instead the dialectic relationship that necessarily exists 
between the prospective intentions of rulemakers and the actual application 
of open-textured provisions over time.‖197 In their view, ―[s]uch a mode of 
analysis‖ would have rejected the application of Rule 23 in Shady 
Grove.
198
  
Neither Justice Ginsburg nor Burbank and Wolff had to resort to 
concepts like ―remed[ies],‖ ―important public norms,‖ or ―the dialectic 
relationship that necessarily exists between the prospective intentions of 
rulemakers and the actual application of open-textured provisions over 
time.‖ The old ―rigid formal categories‖ work just fine. One can 
understand their concern with ratcheting up an action worth $500 to one 
worth $5,000,000 as a concern with overdeterrence. As a matter of 
legislative history and common sense, New York provided statutory 
penalties for late payments because, in the absence of such penalties, no 
one would have any incentive to bring a lawsuit, and thus insurers would 
have no incentive to pay insurance proceeds on time.
199
 But the class action 
similarly vindicates ―the rights of groups of people who individually would 
be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.‖200 
These are not complementary measures except under certain 
circumstances.
201
 You can have one or the other, but you cannot have both 
because it would lead to an excessive penalty that may lead to ―annihilating 
                                                                                                                     
 194. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 8, at 64. 
 195. Id. at 57. 
 196. Id. at 53.  
 197. Id. at 65–66 (criticizing Justice Scalia‘s plurality opinion in Shady Grove). 
 198. Id. at 66. 
 199. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (noting that ―[t]he legislative history of § 901 thus reveals a classically procedural 
calibration of making it easier to litigate claims in New York courts (under any source of law) only 
when it is necessary to do so, and not making it too easy when the class tool is not required,‖ but 
concluding that the legislative history is sufficiently ambiguous to permit the application of Rule 
23). 
 200. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) 
(discussing Rule 23). 
 201. But see infra Part III.B (discussing multiplier damages as complementary to class actions). 
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punishment of the defendant.‖202 In fact, given the risk of such excessive 
penalties for a late payment, some insurers may avoid providing certain 
types of insurance at all, thereby defeating the purpose of having the 
penalties in the first place. Taken together, application of Rule 23 to the 
case in Shady Grove would violate the Enabling Act because it would 
modify a substantive right—the right to insurance which pays its benefits 
on time.  
C.  Avoiding the Wrong and the Rules Enabling Act 
Defining the substantive right as the right to avoid a legal violation has 
the benefit of clarifying the two different tests of validity that apply to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to federal common law procedures in 
the ―relatively unguided Erie‖ context.203  
In part, the confusion that surrounds the outcome-determinative test in 
the unguided Erie context and the test that applies in the Enabling Act 
context arises from a failure by courts to use the ex ante perspective. This 
is especially true in the context of the outcome-determinative test, where, 
prior to Hanna v. Plumer, courts took an ex post perspective to determine 
whether the choice of procedure affected the outcome in the case before it, 
which it always did.
204
 An ex ante perspective, in contrast, would 
determine whether, at the outset of litigation, the choice of procedure 
would affect the outcome of a case. This ex ante perspective would not 
only be forward looking, but would also acknowledge the fact that the 
procedures at issue would apply to all cases generally, not just the one 
before the court. Thus, from this ex ante perspective, a court can more 
properly determine whether the choice of the state procedure or the federal 
procedure would affect the ―twin aims‖ of Erie in avoiding ―forum 
shopping‖ and the ―inequitable administration of the laws.‖205 
But recognizing the avoidance of the legal violation as the relevant 
substantive right under the Enabling Act further demonstrates that the two 
tests consider different points in time. The outcome-determinative test 
looks to the effect of the choice of procedure on any given case.  
Accordingly, the test limits its perspective to the beginning of litigation, 
not to any primary conduct before it.  
                                                                                                                     
 202. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1458 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (citations omitted).‖. 
 203. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (distinguishing the ―relatively unguided Erie‖ 
test under the Rules of Decision Act and the test under the Rules Enabling Act). 
 204. Id. at 468 (noting that, under this ex post approach, ―every procedural variation is 
‗outcome-determinative‘‖). 
 205. Id.; see also Tidmarsh, supra note 173, at 908–10 (arguing also for the comparison of 
procedures based on their effect on the claim‘s ―ex ante expected value,‖ but applying this principle 
to both the Erie and Rules Enabling Act contexts). 
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In contrast, the test under the Rules Enabling Act focuses on a much 
earlier point in time to see whether the contemplation of litigation (even if 
it did not occur) would abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right. For 
example, the deterrent effect of a claim for damages, which secures the 
substantive right of avoiding a legal violation, is achieved by forcing the 
potential defendant to contemplate potential litigation ―at the stage of 
primary private activity.‖206 In fact, if the deterrent effect of the damage 
claim works properly, the litigation may never materialize under certain 
liability rules.  
To see the difference between the two tests, consider a highly stylized 
example. Suppose that a law in state X prohibits a company from 
producing cars with safety defects. Moreover, state X enforces this 
prohibition through a strict-liability rule.
207
 Further suppose that the 
compensatory interests of the parties are nonexistent because all 
individuals in the state are required to insure against all losses caused by 
car accidents.
208
 Assume that state X and all other states have also adopted 
a ―collateral source rule‖ which would require courts to reduce any 
damages awarded by the insurance benefits received by the victims.
209
 
Now suppose that a Rule is adopted through the Rules Enabling Act 
which would require courts to apply a negligence rule to all car defect 
cases in diversity jurisdiction. This rule would limit the number of cases 
filed in federal courts because a victim can sue for damages caused by a car 
defect only when she can additionally allege negligence.
210
 Assume that the 
Advisory Committee is aware of this advantage, and thus promulgates the 
                                                                                                                     
 206. Ely, supra note 9, at 725 (quoting HART & WECHSLER, 1953, supra note 131, at 678). 
 207. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(a) (1998) (providing for strict 
liability for ―a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though 
all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product‖); Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (justifying 
imposition of strict liability for manufacturing risks because ―the risk of injury can be insured by the 
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business‖). 
 208. Many states mandate insurance coverage for car accidents. See Gary T. Schwartz, Auto 
No-Fault and First-Party Insurance: Advantages and Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611 (2000); cf. 
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Products Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1437, 1491 (2010) (noting that the availability of third-party insurance for losses is a consideration 
in favor of ―curtailing‖ products liability).  
 209. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4545(a) (defining collateral sources, including ―insurance,‖ that 
must be used to offset any damage award). 
 210. See Steven Shavell, A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule 
Over Regulation 3 (Sept. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2144553 (noting that, all things being equal, ―the superiority of the negligence 
rule . . . rest[s] on the observation that under the rule, compliance with a standard reduces the 
number of instances in which behavior is examined‖). 
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negligence rule with the justification that it would ―clear the dockets so 
they do juster justice in other cases.‖211  
Would a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure mandating the use of a 
negligence rule when a strict-liability rule would apply under state law 
violate the Enabling Act? Under certain restrictive assumptions, it may not. 
Assume that the car manufacturer is from state Y, and thus all citizens of 
state X could bring a diversity suit in either federal court or state court. If 
the negligence rule applies only when the defendant has not exercised the 
optimal level of care, and the levels of care of the car manufacturer are the 
only determinants of safety, then it would induce the same level of safety 
as a strict-liability rule.
212
 In other words, the use of the negligence rule 
under these assumptions would not ―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ the 
―substantive right‖ of a reasonably safe vehicle, since you get the same safe 
vehicle under either rule.
213
 Moreover, given the lack of any need for 
compensation due to the existence of compulsory insurance, the use of a 
negligence rule also would not abridge any right, substantive or not, in 
compensation for any losses. Indeed, the collection of insurance proceeds 
would offset any receipt of compensation.
214
 
Of course, if any of the underlying assumptions change, such as the 
number of cars manufactured and on the road being a determinant of the 
overall safety of the car, then it would not satisfy the second sentence of 
the Enabling Act.
215
 But it is important to emphasize that the relevant 
inquiry for Enabling Act purposes is whether the right to a safe car is 
substantially ―modif[ied],‖ not whether the claim is substantially modified. 
Admittedly, the Rule would ―abridge‖ the claims of injured plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                     
 211. Cf. Ely, supra note 9, at 706–07 n.77 (arguing that a ―no fault liability‖ rule designed to 
―clear their dockets‖ would be permitted under the first sentence of the Enabling Act since it would 
―really regulate procedure,‖ even though it would violate the second sentence); Mishkin, supra note 
78, at 1684 & n.10 (criticizing Ely, and arguing that neither Congress nor the courts could adopt 
such a rule). 
 212. SHAVELL, supra note 189, at 9 (noting that, under the above assumptions, ―[b]oth forms 
of liability result in the same, socially optimal behavior‖).  
 213. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 214. Arguably the substantive rights of the car manufacturer would be modified because, under 
a strict-liability rule, the car manufacturer would have to pay for all losses, while, under a 
negligence rule, the manufacturer would only have to pay for losses caused by its negligence. Under 
certain assumptions, however, the rights of the car manufacturer would also not be modified. In a 
competitive market, the expected liability of the car manufacturer under either rule would be passed 
on to the customers. Moreover, assuming no deadweight losses caused by reduced sales, the impact 
of either rule would be the same for the car manufacturer, although the customers would have to pay 
a higher price for the car under a strict liability rule. Even then, the higher price a customer would 
pay would be offset by the lower premium the customer would pay to the insurance company.  
 215. SHAVELL, supra note 189, at 17 (noting differences between negligence and strict liability 
rules when certain dimensions change, such as the level of activity); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability 
Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–6 (1980) (arguing that the negligence rule is optimal 
when levels of care determine risk of injury, while the strict liability rule is optimal when levels of 
activity determine risk of injury). 
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whose injuries were not caused by the car manufacturer‘s negligence. In 
the absence of a strict-liability rule, these plaintiffs would not be able to 
bring a claim for damages. Nevertheless, the rule would be valid because it 
would not ―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ the right to a safe car. 
In contrast to the Enabling Act inquiry, if federal courts adopted a 
negligence rule for car defect cases as a matter of federal common law, 
then such a choice of procedure obviously would be outcome-
determinative. But, as with the Enabling Act inquiry, this is not because 
the federal common law negligence rule would abridge the plaintiffs‘ 
claims. In fact, unlike the Rules Enabling Act, the Rules of Decision Act 
does not mention substance at all.
216
 Instead, such a rule, evaluated from an 
ex ante perspective taken at the beginning of the litigation, would 
substantially determine the outcome of those cases. In fact, citizens of state 
X would never file suit in federal court, but would always be removed to 
federal court by the car manufacturer, a citizen of Y. Here the forum 
shopping would be manifest, even though the underlying level of safety 
would be the same.  
As evidenced by the negligence-rule example, defining the relevant 
substantive right for Rules Enabling Act purposes as avoiding the legal 
violation has the further implication of defining the claim as part of 
procedure. It is part of the ex post enforcement procedure by which the 
primary entitlement is protected. Indeed, the issue of whether to recognize 
a cause of action is not that different functionally from procedural 
doctrines such as standing.
217
  
D.  Avoiding the Wrong and the “Unguided Erie” Doctrine 
The negligence-rule example above shows how extinguishing one‘s 
cause of action may not necessarily ―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ a 
―substantive right,‖ properly understood.218 But it is unclear how a 
common law procedure that modifies the claim can avoid being outcome-
determinative.  
Consider, however, another example, one more grounded in reality. In 
2005 Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which, 
among other things, exploited the diversity jurisdiction provided by the 
Constitution to permit the removal of multistate class actions to federal 
                                                                                                                     
 216. Ely, supra note 9, at 722–23 (noting that, under the Rules of Decision Act, ―the court 
need ordinarily not concern itself with whether the federal rule urged by one party, or the state rule 
urged by the other, is most fairly designated as substantive or procedural‖). 
 217. See generally Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading 
of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975) (analogizing standing doctrines to procedures like the class 
action). 
 218. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
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court.
219
 Although Congress expanded diversity jurisdiction for multistate 
class actions, it did not otherwise provide for any other substantive law to 
apply to those actions. Consequently, scholars have debated the extent to 
which federal courts applying common law could fill in the gap left by 
Congress.
220
  
One significant issue is the choice of law rule that would apply to the 
removed class actions under CAFA. Specifically, to what extent can 
federal courts modify or create a choice of law rule to facilitate the 
certification of class actions?
221
 A change to the choice of law rule would 
be necessary to avoid the ―commonality‖ and ―predominance‖ problems 
that would arise from a federal court having to apply up to fifty different 
state laws.
222
 
Courts and scholars have generally concluded that both Erie and 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.
 223
 limit the changing of 
choice of law rules to facilitate class certification. In Klaxon, decided after 
Erie, the Supreme Court held that in diversity cases, ―[t]he conflict of laws 
rules to be applied by the federal court . . . must conform to those 
prevailing in [the] state courts‖ where the federal court is located.224 
Consequently, ―federal courts in these class action, choice of law cases 
                                                                                                                     
 219. Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.) (expanding diversity jurisdiction and imposing limitations on class action 
settlements to prevent class action attorneys from selling out the class); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d) (2006) (providing for diversity jurisdiction for multistate class actions and similar ―mass 
action[s]‖). Specifically, CAFA exploited the ―minimal diversity‖ provided under Article III of the 
Constitution but not available due to the complete diversity rule. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (noting this constitutional ―minimal‖ diversity in the 
context of a multistate class action). 
 220. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 140, at 1943 & n.129 (―[T]here is evidence that in enacting 
CAFA, Congress did not intend to alter the ordering of federal and state lawmaking authority 
established by Erie v. Tompkins and its progeny.‖); Burbank, supra note 186, at 1529 (quoting S. 
Rep. No. 109-14 (2005) for the proposition that CAFA does not change the application of Erie); 
Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 
1419–20 (2006) (explaining need, and possible potential, for ―incremental decisional law‖); 
Suzanna Sherry, Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions and National Common Law, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2135, 2136 (2008) (arguing that CAFA effectively ―overrul[ed] Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, at least for the national-market cases that it places within federal court jurisdiction‖).  
 221. See Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2001, 2002 (2008) (arguing for an ―anti-Klaxon‖ rule for choice of law issues arising from 
national market class actions); Sherry, supra note 220, at 2136. 
 222. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring a finding that ―there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class‖); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring a finding that ―questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members‖); see 
also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 
2002) (Easterbrook, J.) (concluding that common issues did not predominate because of multiple 
state laws). 
 223. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 224. Id. at 496. 
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[have] felt bound under Erie and Klaxon to adopt the choice of law 
approach of the respective states in which they sat, and thus were limited 
as to how they might expressly shape choice of law to accommodate 
aggregate litigation.‖225 In fact, the Klaxon rule has been invoked by courts 
and scholars as requiring, in most cases, a federal court in a class action 
with claims from multiple states to apply the state law that would apply to 
each individual claim, since many states would apply ―the law where the 
harm occurred.‖226 Of course, such a requirement prevents certification of 
the class action because an action where different state laws would apply 
depending on the individual claim would lack the ―predominance‖ of 
common issues necessary to make the class action manageable.
227
 
But Erie and Klaxon, properly understood, do not prevent a federal 
court from considering creative options in certifying a class action with 
claims based on multiple state laws. As argued above, the outcome-
determinative test is best understood as a test that evaluates, from the ex 
ante perspective of a case about to be litigated, whether the choice of a 
procedure would materially affect the outcome of the case. Accordingly, 
the outcome-determinative test permits any federal common law procedure 
if it would not materially affect the expected liability facing the defendant 
or the expected recovery of each of the plaintiffs at the outset of the 
litigation.
228
 
Indeed, Klaxon is merely an application of Erie‘s outcome-
determinative test. In Klaxon, the Court adopted a rule that courts must 
follow the choice of law rules of the forum state because it concluded that 
Erie ―extends to the field of conflict of laws.‖229 Thus, the Klaxon Court 
adopted its choice of law rule because ―[a]ny other ruling would do 
violence to the principle of uniformity within a state upon which the [Erie] 
decision is based.‖230 In other words, the Klaxon rule is only an offshoot of 
the Rules of Decision Act‘s requirement of vertical uniformity.231 
The Court, in fact, has deviated from the Klaxon rule when applying 
the rule would frustrate vertical uniformity. In Van Dusen v. Barrack, for 
                                                                                                                     
 225. Silberman, supra note 221, at 2015 (discussing cases). 
 226. See, e.g., Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1016 (noting that Indiana is a ―lex loci delicti‖ state); 
Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996); Patrick 
Woolley, Choice of Law and the Protection of Class Members in Class Suits Certified Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 799. 
 227. See, e.g., Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1016 (denying class certification for a lack of 
predominance given that adjudicating individual claims under multiple state laws would make the 
class action unmanageable). 
 228. See Tidmarsh, supra note 173, at 908–10 (arguing also for the comparison of procedures 
based on their effect on the claim‘s ―ex ante expected value‖). 
 229. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Ely, supra note 9, at 714–15 n.125 (arguing that Klaxon is required by the Rules of 
Decision Act).  
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example, the Court considered whether the Klaxon rule applied when the 
defendant sought to transfer the action to a different state with a choice of 
law rule more favorable to the defendant.
232
 Specifically, under the choice 
of law rules of the transferee court, Massachusetts law would apply to the 
plaintiffs‘ claims, which was more defendant-friendly than the 
Pennsylvania law that would apply to the plaintiffs‘ claims under the 
choice of law rules of the original, transferor court.
233
 The plaintiffs 
opposed by stressing that, under Klaxon, the transfer ―would be 
accompanied by a highly prejudicial change in the applicable state law.‖234 
Thus, the plaintiffs argued that permitting the defendants to change the 
conflict of law rules via transfer, when the defendant could not do so in 
state court, would disrupt vertical uniformity.
235
  
The Van Dusen Court agreed, noting that, although it was construing a 
statute, its departure from the Klaxon rule ―is supported by the policy 
underlying Erie.‖236 The Court pointed out that, under Erie, ―we should 
ensure that the ‗accident‘ of federal diversity jurisdiction does not enable a 
party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which could 
not have been achieved in the courts of the State where the action was 
filed.‖237 Accordingly, the Court applied the conflict of law rules of the 
original, transferor forum since ―the critical identity to be maintained is 
between the federal district court which decides the case and the courts of 
the State in which the action was filed.‖238  
The Van Dusen Court demonstrates that the Klaxon rule can, and 
should, give way when the rule would undermine the vertical uniformity 
between state courts and federal courts in diversity cases. Moreover, the 
Van Dusen Court shows that the key perspective in determining whether a 
procedure either maintains or undermines vertical uniformity is the ex ante 
expectations of the parties at the outset of the litigation. The Court, in 
particular, focused on the anticipated prejudice that would result from the 
transfer, not any actual prejudice, to conclude that vertical uniformity 
would be disrupted by the application of the Klaxon rule.   
Thus, Erie and Klaxon (via Van Dusen) allow for creative uses of 
choice of law rules in the CAFA context. In CAFA litigation involving 
small claims, the defendant‘s ex ante liability at the outset of the litigation 
would be based on the aggregate net expected recovery of the plaintiffs. 
One could calculate that aggregate expected recovery by trying a random 
                                                                                                                     
 232. 376 U.S. 612 (1964); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) (permitting transfer of venue 
―to any district or division in which it could have been brought‖). 
 233. Id. at 627. 
 234. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 626. 
 235. Id. at 637–38. 
 236. Id. at 637. 
 237. Id. at 638. 
 238. Id. at 639. 
41
Campos: Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1614 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
sample of the plaintiffs‘ claims to get a fairly accurate determination of the 
aggregate amount of actual damages.
239
 Thus, the defendant‘s ex ante 
expectations would be the same under such sampling procedures. 
Moreover, one could use the same procedures to approximate the expected 
recovery for each plaintiff, and similarly would not be outcome-
determinative. 
One could also apply the ―average law‖ to each claim, thus ensuring 
both ―commonality‖ as to issues of law and that the outcome would be the 
same as if the defendant litigated each claim separately.
240
 In other words, 
applying the average law to all claims would result in the same aggregate 
expected liability as applying the relevant state law to each claim.
241
 In 
fact, where the claims are small, the difference in the expected recovery for 
each plaintiff would most likely be negligible, and thus not be so outcome-
determinative as to foster forum shopping.
242
  
Admittedly, these two approaches would substantially modify the 
claims and defenses of the parties. But none of these approaches would be 
outcome-determinative under either Erie or Klaxon, properly understood. 
Indeed, and somewhat counterintuitively, the size of the class would make 
it easier, not harder, for courts to conclude that any of the above averaging 
procedures would not affect the outcome of the case. The large number of 
plaintiffs would increase the likelihood that an attempt to determine 
average liability would mimic what a plaintiff would obtain in actual, one-
on-one litigation. 
It is worth noting that the use of averaging as a choice of law rule 
would not only be consistent with Erie, but would also be consistent with 
the purposes behind CAFA. CAFA was enacted primarily to prevent 
abusive multistate class actions certified by state courts by permitting 
removal of such class actions to federal court.
243
 But scholars fail to 
acknowledge that we continue to allow states to regulate strictly local 
matters. It follows that multistate class actions in state court are 
problematic because they could lead to outcomes that substantially differ 
from those that would be reached if each claim were to be brought in state 
court as a local matter. Accordingly, if the federal choice of law rule could 
mimic in a class action what would result if each claim was brought 
                                                                                                                     
 239. See Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOKLYN J. OF INT‘L. L. 751, 786–
88 (discussing accuracy of random sampling and citing sources).  
 240. Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A Solution to the Choice-of-Law Problem of 
Differing State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374, 375–77 
(providing such a proposal). 
 241. Id. at 27 (noting that ―[a]pplying the average law ‗accurately‘ reproduces the aggregate 
outcome for both deterrence and compensation purposes‖). 
 242. Such a rule, in fact, may even be non-outcome-determinative for large claims if, as 
suggested in the negligence rule example set forth above, all states had a collateral source rule and 
all plaintiffs would be insured for their losses.  
 243. See generally Burbank, supra note 186. 
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separately in state court, then the concerns of CAFA are adequately 
addressed, fully consistent with Erie. 
Arguably, such procedures would not mimic the outcome of separate 
actions because many of the actions, particularly those involving small 
claims, would not be brought at all. But defining this practical reality as the 
relevant baseline would raise Rules Enabling Act concerns. In the CAFA 
context, a federal court not only has to determine whether it can make 
common law concerning choice of law rules, but also whether it can apply 
the Rules to the litigation. Thus, for any proposed class action in the CAFA 
context, federal courts would have to evaluate whether its application of 
Rule 23 would ―abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.‖244  
Accordingly, a court would not only have to be sensitive to the 
concerns with the abuse of the class action that animated the passage of 
CAFA, but would also have to be aware that it cannot simply permit 
removal of multistate class actions to kill them. Instead, it would have to 
determine whether the application of Rule 23 would abridge or modify 
each plaintiff‘s substantive right to avoid the legal violation reflected in the 
liability rule. CAFA would permit a federal court to use Rule 23 because it 
would facilitate the imposition of the defendant‘s aggregate liability, which 
would be consistent with the enforcement objectives of the claim.
245
 In 
fact, CAFA arguably requires a federal court to use Rule 23 because the 
lack of a class action would ―deprive‖ each plaintiff‘s right to avoid the 
violation.
246
 
III.  THE CHOICE OF ENFORCEMENT DEFAULTS 
A.  Procedures as Enforcement Defaults 
Defining the relevant substantive right as the right to avoid the legal 
violation recasts the choice of law that the Erie doctrine governs. Because, 
                                                                                                                     
 244. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).  
 245. See Campos, supra note 156, at 1082–85 (arguing that optimal deterrence requires 
imposition of total aggregate liability, citing sources); Campos, supra note 239, 796–800 (same); 
see also Cover, supra note 217, at 735 (arguing that the use of Rule 23 class actions in most 
contexts would be permissible under the Rules Enabling Act given its ―substantive impact‖ on the 
―substantive values‖ at stake).  
It should be noted that, as mentioned earlier, the Court has considered such averaging 
procedures as violations of the Rules Enabling Act because they consider the claim and its 
constituent entitlements, including individual defenses, the relevant ―substantive right‖ for Enabling 
Act purposes. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (rejecting such a 
―Trial By Formula‖ as a violation of the Rules Enabling Act since it would infringe the defendant‘s 
right to assert statutory defenses). But see Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782–87 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (permitting the use of random sampling of claims to determine aggregate damages in a 
class action involving human rights abuses). However, as argued above, this conclusion stems from 
ignoring the avoidance of the legal violation as the relevant ―substantive right.‖ 
 246. Cf. Campos, supra note 156, at 1096–98 (arguing that deterrence is a ―liberty‖ interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause). 
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as this Article argues above,
247
 the primary function of all civil procedures, 
indeed of all civil liability, is to prevent the legal wrong, then the choice of 
using a state procedure or a federal procedure can be understood as a 
choice between different enforcement defaults. In other words, in creating a 
court system to adjudicate claims arising from civil liability, both state 
governments and the federal government are providing off-the-rack, public 
options for enforcing the substantive rights associated with those claims.  
But these off-the-rack defaults are just that, defaults. As an initial 
matter, the parties themselves can elect to use their own procedures rather 
than state or federal courts, as when parties agree to submit claims to 
arbitration.
248
 Moreover, a state or federal government could define 
different enforcement mechanisms for the protection of these rights, as it 
does when it promulgates administrative procedures.
249
 Both state 
governments and the federal government could protect a substantive right 
to safety through public enforcement, such as through attorney general 
actions, rather than through a private right of action.
250
 Likewise, ex ante 
regulation may by itself be sufficient to protect the substantive right to 
safety.
251
 
B.  The Difficulty of the Choice 
Conceptualizing the Erie choice as a choice of enforcement defaults, 
however, poses two additional problems. The first problem is determining 
the relevant justifications for a procedure. For example, if the Rules 
Enabling Act prohibits a Rule that would ―abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right,‖252 then it will matter whether a conflicting state 
procedure has a procedural justification or a substantive one.
253
 This 
conundrum is exemplified by Professor Ely‘s exchange with Professor 
Abram Chayes
254
 over the Court‘s decision in Erie cases like Sibbach.255 In 
                                                                                                                     
 247. See supra Section II.B. 
 248. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–53 (2011) 
(upholding arbitration clause in contract for cell phone services); see also Bone, supra note 15, at 
1337 (noting that parties can contract around procedure, such as through arbitration). 
 249. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011) (holding that the 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, which sets up a no-fault compensation scheme 
administered by the Court of Federal Claims, preempted state law tort claims). 
 250. Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims 
Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 317–18 (2010) (suggesting parens patriae suits 
as a substitute for class actions given the difficulty of certifying consumer class actions). 
 251. Cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (concluding that state law tort claims were 
not preempted by ex ante regulatory scheme of the federal Food and Drug Administration). 
 252. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).  
 253. Ely, supra note 9, at 722–23. 
 254. Chayes, supra note 127; Ely, supra note 127. Chayes and Ely also discussed Hanna and 
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), but their discussion of 
Sibbach suffices to demonstrate the difficulty of inferring state policies. 
 255. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1940).  
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Sibbach, again, the Court examined Rule 35, which permits a party to 
compel medical examinations.
256
 As Ely noted, the Court held that the 
Rule was valid because it ―really regulates procedure,‖ but was ―almost 
willfully blindered‖ to the issue of whether it would ―abridge, enlarge or 
modify‖ a ―substantive right‖ in violation of the Enabling Act.257  
Ely concluded that the issue was ambiguous because the Court never 
determined the state law procedure that would have applied in the absence 
of the Rule.
258
 But as Professor Chayes pointed out in response, even if the 
Court had tried to determine the procedure under state law and the 
justifications for it, it still would have had a hard time determining whether 
any such practice was substantive in the Enabling Act sense. Specifically, 
Chayes showed that Illinois state law most likely would have applied, and 
that Illinois courts had prohibited such medical examinations.
259
 The 
Illinois state courts barely mentioned any rationale for the rule other than a 
procedural one—the concern that ―a physician designated by the court will 
have excessive weight with the jury, as compared to that of experts called 
by the parties.‖260  
This would suggest that application of Rule 35 would not abridge a 
substantive right. However, Chayes complicated matters further by noting 
that Illinois courts likely ruled in the shadow of Union Pacific Railway v. 
Botsford, where the Supreme Court, in a pre-Rules decision, prohibited 
medical examinations in part because of the ―sacred . . . right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference by others‖261 Although Illinois courts were not 
influenced by Botsford, other states were, which would have complicated 
any analysis of the justification for prohibiting medical examinations in 
discovery.
262
 Professor Chayes did not read the Botsford language as 
sufficient in itself to provide a substantive justification for a prohibition of 
medical examinations in discovery. He also did not consider the state 
responses to Botsford as sufficiently providing a substantive justification. 
However, one could imagine that the Court would encounter some 
difficulty in determining whether a substantive rationale for a state 
procedure existed based on a bare statement like the one in Botsford.  
In discussing Sibbach, Professor Chayes suggested that the silence on 
the part of a state, or even statements like the one in Botsford, may not 
fully reflect the procedural or substantive justifications for a particular 
                                                                                                                     
 256. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(1) (―The court where the action is pending may order a 
party whose mental or physical condition—including a blood group—is in controversy to submit it 
to a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner.‖). 
 257. Ely, supra note 9, at 733.  
 258. Id. at 734. 
 259. Chayes, supra note 127, at 742–43 (citing Parker v. Enslow, 102 Ill. 272 (1882)). 
 260. Id. at 743. 
 261. Id. at 742–48 (1974) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). 
 262. Id. 
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procedure. According to Chayes, ―[i]t will not do to put too much 
significance on the language of a single opinion, especially on the reasons 
adduced at a particular moment for not changing the status quo.‖263 Indeed, 
in concluding his response, Chayes highlighted again that ―not even the 
most luminous analytic framework relieves us of the necessity of 
discerning between state and federal policies at stake in cases involving a 
choice between state and federal law,‖ and strongly recommended ―fidelity 
to the context of history and system in which they spoke and acted.‖264 Of 
course, ―fidelity‖ to ―context‖ is easier said than done. The problem, in 
fact, manifests itself on the federal side in determining whether there is a 
procedural ―gap‖ or not.265  
The second problem is assessing, as a factual matter, the substantive 
impact of a procedure.
266
 Arguably, and as suggested by Professor Ely, the 
only problem is, and really should be, the first one of determining 
legislative intent.
267
 In fact, as argued below, there are functional reasons 
for reducing the Enabling Act inquiry to the formal question of whether the 
procedure has an express procedural or substantive justification.
268
  
But there are two reasons why courts should go beyond determining the 
intent behind a procedure. The first reason has to do with opportunism. As 
mentioned earlier in discussing problems associated with discerning 
whether a procedural gap exists, a state may decide to declare all 
procedures as matters of substance to control the result in diversity 
cases.
269
 Indeed, one benefit of the outcome-determinative test under Erie 
is that it avoids relying upon the stated rationales for a practice by 
determining whether a state law procedure is, in fact, outcome-
determinative and, even then, whether a federal procedure should still 
apply due to ―countervailing affirmative considerations.‖270   
The second reason is more subtle, and arises from the Due Process 
Clause.
271
 It may turn out that a court cannot trust the stated rationales for a 
procedure due to legislative pathologies. A formal defect in legislative 
process or a more insidious defect, such as the complete subordination of 
minority interests, may taint the stated justification. Such defects would 
                                                                                                                     
 263. Id. at 748. 
 264. Id. at 753. 
 265. See supra Section I.D. 
 266. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1473 (1987) 
(book review) (discussing the importance of determining ―the impact of procedural rules‖ along 
with ―the purposes of procedural rules‖). 
 267. See Ely, supra note 9, at 724 n.170 (―The test suggested is geared to the purposes 
underlying the state rule and not to whether the rule ‗in fact‘ serves substantive or procedural 
ends.‖). 
 268. See infra Section III.C. 
 269. See infra Section I.D. 
 270. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).  
 271. See infra Section I.C.  
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cast doubt on whether the procedure would, in fact, ―promote the general 
Welfare.‖272 Less dramatically, a proposed substantive justification for a 
procedure may not withstand scrutiny, or otherwise would be inconsistent 
with the procedural scheme already in place. 
The second problem is much tougher than the first because judges, as 
attorneys, have significant training in legal interpretation, but hardly any in 
policy.
273
 Consider, for example, Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, where the 
Court, sitting in maritime jurisdiction, addressed the enforceability of a 
forum-selection clause.
274
 There, the plaintiffs, who resided in Washington, 
purchased a ticket for a cruise on the Tropicale, a cruise ship operated by 
Carnival. The back of the ticket provided the following forum-selection 
clause:  
It is agreed by and between the passenger and [Carnival] that 
all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in 
connection with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, 
if at all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, 
U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or 
country.
275
 
The plaintiffs were injured on the cruise and filed suit in Washington 
federal court. The appeals court, sitting in maritime jurisdiction, concluded 
that the forum-selection clause was not enforceable based on a federal 
common law rule that such clauses were against public policy.
276
  
But the Court in Carnival reversed, concluding, in an opinion by 
Justice Harry Blackmun, that the clause was enforceable because, unlike in 
prior cases, ―we must . . . account for the realities of form passage 
contracts.‖277 Specifically, the use of such form contracts provides some 
benefits for cruise lines like Carnival because it reduces the ―time and 
                                                                                                                     
 272. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938) (applying rational basis review to legislation under the Due Process Clause, but noting in a 
footnote that such review may be more searching if the legislation affected ―discrete and insular 
minorities‖). Indeed, it is not out of the question to consider whether a procedure would ―promote 
the general Welfare‖ in evaluating procedures. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 
(1970) (―Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to ‗promote the general Welfare, 
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.‘ The same governmental 
interests that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those 
eligible to receive it; pre-termination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end.‖). 
 273. This is arguably one of the major failures of law school education. See David Rosenberg, 
The Path Not Taken, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1044, 1044 (1997). 
 274. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587 (1990). 
 275. Id. at 587–88 (quoting the terms and conditions of the ticket). 
 276. Id. at 588–89. The district court had dismissed the suit on personal jurisdiction grounds, 
but the appeals court reversed. Id. at 588. 
 277. Id. at 593 (distinguishing the ―business contexts in which the respective contracts were 
executed‖ in this case and in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)). 
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expense‖ of litigating over the appropriate forum.278 Forum-selection 
clauses further benefit passengers like the plaintiffs ―in the form of reduced 
fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in 
which it may be sued.‖279 Finally, there was no evidence in the record of a 
bad faith motive on the part of Carnival to avoid liability, as well as no 
evidence of ―fraud or overreaching.‖280  
In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggested that the forum-selection clause 
was really an exculpation clause, and such clauses are typically not 
enforced as a matter of public policy.
281
 Moreover, he emphasized that 
many passengers would not have even been aware of the forum-selection 
clause.
282
 Even if they were, the ―disparate bargaining power between the 
carrier and the passenger‖ would have prevented them from contracting 
around it, thus ―undermin[ing] the strong public interest in deterring 
negligent conduct.‖283  
Unlike in the Erie and Enabling Act contexts, the Court in Carnival did 
not face the choice between a state enforcement default and a federal 
default. Instead, the Court was sitting in maritime jurisdiction and could 
exercise practically unfettered common law power. But the Court‘s 
unfettered power did not make the default issue any easier. On the one 
hand, Justice Blackmun is correct to note that, in many contexts involving 
mass-produced products and services, the imposition of any additional 
procedures may simply be a wealth transfer. If the Court imposed a 
mandatory rule that forum-selection clauses are not enforceable, then it 
would result in Carnival passing on the costs of defending in multiple fora 
to the plaintiffs and other purchasers.
284
 But that presumes that the market 
for cruises is competitive. If, as suggested by Justice Stevens‘s reference to 
―disparate bargaining power,‖ Carnival could exercise monopolistic 
pricing power, it could impose costs, including forcing passengers to agree 
to an inconvenient forum, which may not be welfare-enhancing.  
The Court‘s conclusion further presumes that the passengers are well 
informed, and that the choice to forgo a more convenient forum is either a 
considered choice or one that the passengers would have made had they 
known about it. In other words, the passengers were not willing to pay 
more for the option to sue in a more convenient forum. This presumption 
                                                                                                                     
 278. Id. at 594. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 595. 
 281. Id. at 598 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 282. Id. at 597 
 283. Id. at 598. 
 284. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 918 (1984) (noting that, in the context of mass-
produced products and services, ―[i]n purchasing the product or service that resulted in exposure, 
every claimant—indeed, every exposed purchaser—bought from the firm what was in effect 
insurance against tortious injury‖). 
48
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 6 [2012], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss6/4
2012] ERIE AS A CHOICE OF ENFORCEMENT DEFAULTS 1621 
 
of consumer knowledge is far from likely,
285
 and ignores the prevalence of 
loss aversion and other behavioral limitations on the rationality of 
passengers.
286
 Indeed, the quasi-―rule of reason‖ analysis that the Court 
engaged in suggests that the general enforceability of forum-selection 
clauses may be better understood as an antitrust issue rather than a contract 
law issue.
287
 
The difficulty of the choice in Carnival is compounded by the fact that 
the Court is not only deciding a case, but choosing an ex ante rule that will 
apply to all future cases. Thus, in enforcing forum-selection clauses 
contained in ―form passage contracts,‖288 the Court, in essence, set up the 
traditional doctrines of personal jurisdiction and venue as defaults that can 
be contracted around in all form contracts. Indeed, holding that these 
clauses are enforceable in form contracts would inevitably lead to strategic 
use of such clauses. As was probably the case in Carnival, Carnival had 
more information about the relative costs and benefits of designating 
different forums than the passengers, and likely tucked in the clause to 
―strategically withhold‖ information about the choice of forum from 
unsophisticated passengers.
289
 Indeed, such strategic use of defaults would 
not necessarily imply ―bad faith,‖ ―fraud[,] or overreaching.‖290 After all, 
the passengers could have simply read the ticket. 
The choice of defaults does not get easier once the conflicting interests 
of a state are involved. Consider AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 
where the Court considered the enforceability of an arbitration clause 
contained in a cell phone contract which prohibited consumers from 
bringing any claim ―in any purported class or representative proceeding,‖ 
even in arbitration.
291
 Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
provides that all arbitration clauses are ―valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.‖292 The FAA was passed primarily to curb 
―widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,‖ but § 2 includes a 
                                                                                                                     
 285. Cf. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 208, at 1459–61 (noting that products liability can 
increase safety given consumers‘ misperceptions of risk). 
 286. See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER‘S CURSE: THE PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE 63–78 (1992) (discussing the tendency for individuals to have a higher, and 
divergent, ―willingness-to-accept‖ over a ―willingness-to-pay‖ for the exact same good). 
 287. I thank David Rosenberg for suggesting this way of looking at the analysis in Carnival. 
 288. Carnival, 499 U.S. at 591–95 (distinguishing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that forum-selection clause between two businesses was unenforceable)). 
 289. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 124 (noting the importance of structuring 
formalities in contract to inform the uninformed); cf. id. at 106 (criticizing a rule holding ambiguous 
offers unenforceable, particularly when ―the indefiniteness is clearly attributable to one party and 
induces inefficient reliance from the other party‖).  
 290. Carnival, 499 U.S. at 595. 
 291. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
 292. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
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savings clause that contemplates that state contract law may permissibly be 
―grounds‖ for revoking an arbitration clause.293  
Prior to AT&T, the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court held that such class waivers in consumer contexts were 
unconscionable, at least with respect to fraud claims arising from adhesion 
contracts. The California Supreme Court, in particular, concluded that ―the 
waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‗from responsibility 
for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of 
another.‘‖294 Accordingly, the arbitration clause in AT&T was revoked by 
the district court based on this state law ground, otherwise known as the 
Discover rule, and the plaintiffs were permitted to seek class arbitration.  
However, the AT&T Court reversed, and concluded that the application 
of the Discover rule in AT&T would conflict with the FAA. Specifically, 
the Court concluded that the Discover rule, while not facially 
discriminatory against arbitration agreements, would ―[i]n 
practice . . . have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.‖295 
Moreover, the Court concluded that such class actions or similar 
procedures are inconsistent with the goal of the arbitration, which is to 
―allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of 
dispute.‖296 
In the wake of AT&T, some scholars have forecasted the near-total 
demise of the consumer class action, and the resulting negative impact on 
deterrence.
297
 Indeed, as I suggested above in discussing Carnival, it is 
likely that companies that provide mass-produced services will include 
such class waivers in all of their form contracts, most likely in small print 
to exploit uninformed consumers.  
But, again, whether the proliferation of class waivers results in bad 
consequences will depend on the competitiveness of the market and the 
relative information available to the consumers. Assume that AT&T 
                                                                                                                     
 293. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. 
 294. Discover Bank v. Sup. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1668). 
 295. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. Indeed, as noted by Professor Hiro Aragaki, the Court‘s 
nondiscrimination interpretation of the FAA is functionally a disparate impact standard, when a 
disparate treatment standard may be better. See Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1192–93 (2011). Interestingly enough, the ―outcome-determinative‖ test is 
also a disparate impact test. It would be interesting to study the existence of these disparate impact 
standards in these and other contexts and see what they can add to our understanding of disparate 
impact liability in the equality law and Equal Protection context. 
 296. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1749. 
 297. Myriam Gilles, in fact, predicted this outcome six years before AT&T. See Myriam Gilles, 
Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005); see also Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate 
Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012) (discussing 
the impact of AT&T on the availability of class actions in consumer contexts, and concluding that 
some consumer class actions are still possible). 
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included in its cell phone services contract not just a class waiver, but an 
exculpation clause that limited all of its liability. In other words, cell phone 
services are to be purchased ―as-is,‖ with no realistic recourse to arbitration 
or the public judicial system. This may result in suboptimal liability. But if 
the market for cell phone services is sufficiently competitive, it may not. 
Assuming that there is demand for a right to bring suits to enforce rights, 
AT&T‘s competitors may market its phones as not having such 
exculpation clauses. More likely, AT&T may market its phone as a ―no 
frills‖ option compared to the other services provided by its competitors. If 
consumers willingly take on these additional risks for a lower price, or 
demand such rights for a higher price, it is unclear whether there is, in fact, 
any loss in deterrence. In fact, the imposition of additional liability may 
distort prices, leading to suboptimal results.
298
  
One could argue that fraud claims are different because the 
presumption of informed consumers is deliberately lacking when fraud 
occurs. But the case is not so clear cut with fraud. Consumers can take into 
account the relative trustworthiness of different vendors and factor in the 
risk of fraud in comparing products. Thus, companies that engage in shady 
practices would have to sell their products at lower prices or signal their 
good faith by, for example, including warranties that would mimic the 
liability rules abrogated by the exculpation clause. Moreover, caveat 
emptor liability rules are prevalent in contexts where there may be mistrust 
of vendors, such as garage sales, Craigslist, and street vendors. It is unclear 
that liability, let alone class action procedures, would enhance the 
trustworthiness of vendors in those contexts. 
The task of determining the relevant state and federal interests further 
compound these considerations. Unlike in Carnival, the Court in AT&T 
was not deciding whether such waivers should be enforceable per se. 
Instead, it had a considered judgment by the California Supreme Court that 
the right to be free from fraud entailed the availability of class actions and 
similar proceedings for fraud claims arising out of contracts of adhesion. 
Moreover, the Court had to weigh this judgment against the purposes of 
the FAA. 
Justice Scalia, who wrote for the majority, uncharacteristically looked 
beyond the plain text of the FAA to the purposes of the FAA to conclude 
that class action-type procedures like class arbitration are at odds with the 
FAA‘s preference for ―efficient, streamlined‖ procedures.299 That judgment 
                                                                                                                     
 298. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 208, at 1459–61 (noting that in products liability 
circumstances, liability may not be necessary and may in fact distort prices). 
 299. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1744, 1749. Indeed, Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the 
judgment precisely because the majority opinion relied upon purposes of the FAA rather than the 
plain language. See id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring) (―I write separately to explain how I would 
find that limit in the FAA‘s text.‖). Justice Thomas concluded that the class action waivers were 
enforceable despite the Discover rule because he read section two as requiring a ―defect[] in the 
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is suspect, since, as pointed out by Justice Stephen Breyer in his dissent, 
the history and legislative history of the FAA did not demonstrate any 
hostility toward class arbitration, and relevant statistics showed that class 
arbitration ―may take less time than the average class action in court.‖300 
But Justice Scalia‘s resort to purposes was understandable because he was 
concerned with states using the savings clause of § 2 to opportunistically 
discriminate against arbitration in violation of the FAA.
301
 
Accordingly, in AT&T, the Court not only had to determine the default 
that would apply, but also had to independently weigh the competing 
judgments of the state and federal government. Moreover, just as the 
default issue itself was difficult, it only exacerbated the difficulty of 
discerning legislative intent. 
Finally, and counterintuitively, consider again Shady Grove and the 
defaults that arose in that case. As argued earlier, and in contrast to both 
Carnival and AT&T, Shady Grove was a relatively easy case.
302
 One can 
understand the class action prohibition against claims for statutory 
damages under section 901(b) as prohibiting the use of two mutually 
exclusive procedures—statutorily defined damages and the class action—
to encourage small claims litigation. 
But statutory damages may have a different function that is 
complementary to the class action. In some instances, statutorily defined 
damages may be used to account for the difficulties in detecting legal 
violations. For example, federal antitrust laws permit the recovery of treble 
damages,
303
 and scholars have justified such multiplier damages as 
necessary to deter antitrust violations when all violations cannot be 
detected.
304
 For example, if the rate of detection of antitrust violations is 
33%, then tripling actual damages would give potential defendants the 
same ex ante incentives to avoid antitrust suits as a detection rate of 100%. 
However, for these multiplier damages to work, they must multiply the 
total liability of the defendant in a given case. Consequently, in small 
                                                                                                                     
making of an agreement‖ before an arbitration can be invalidated on a state law ground, and the 
Discover rule did not identify any such defect. Id.  
 300. Id. at 1756, 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing statistics from the 
American Arbitration Association). 
 301. Id. at 1745. 
 302. See supra Section II.B. 
 303. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) (providing that persons ―injured . . . by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the 
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney‘s fee‖). 
 304. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 869, 873 (1998) (discussing the function of multiplier damages in antitrust and other 
substantive areas).  
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claims litigation, the class action would be necessary when multiplier 
damages are involved, but section 901(b) would prohibit it.
305
  
Although this rationale was not present in Shady Grove, it could be 
available in a different case before the Court. But the Court failed to 
recognize this possible rationale for statutory damages. Justice Scalia‘s 
approach permits all class actions under the Rules Enabling Act no matter 
what, as long as the plaintiffs are ―willing‖ to be included in the class.306 
Justice Ginsburg‘s approach would continue to view section 901(b) as a 
limitation on the remedy, and thus prevent a class action even when it 
would be required to serve the multiplier function of the remedy.
307
 This 
leaves Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens, like Justice Scalia, would actually 
arrive at the right answer and apply Rule 23, and, unlike Justice Scalia, 
reach the result through an analysis of the second sentence of the Enabling 
Act. But his arrival at the right answer would be a matter of serendipity 
rather than analysis. Justice Stevens would arrive at the decision by taking 
a ―separate piles‖ approach to the distinction between substance and 
procedure.
308
 If Justice Stevens can botch this analysis when applying the 
second sentence of Rules Enabling Act directly, what hope do we have in 
other cases?  
C.  Shifting Information Costs 
It is understandable that courts may be ill-equipped to choose between 
a state default procedure and a federal default procedure. As noted above, 
the legislative justifications for the procedures may be ambiguous, and the 
actual substantive impact of the procedures may also be difficult to assess. 
Both problems arise from a lack of information. In some cases, courts may 
not have sufficient information about the relevant justifications for a 
procedure. Moreover, it is unlikely that a court will have sufficient 
information to ascertain the substantive impact of a procedure.  
The latter problem of determining the actual substantive impact of a 
procedure is exacerbated by the fact that federal courts only have 
                                                                                                                     
 305. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (MCKINNEY 2012) (prohibiting class actions for claims based 
on a ―statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery‖). A ―penalty‖ 
includes multiplier damages. See Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E. 2d 1012, 1016–17 (N.Y. Ct. 
App. 2007) (concluding that section 901(b) prohibited treble damage provisions under state 
antitrust law based on ambiguous legislative history, but noted that such provisions ―may vary 
depending on the context‖).  
 306. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) 
(Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion); see also Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the 
Federal Rules: An Essay on What’s Wrong With the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 
723–4 (2006) (concluding that Semtek‘s ―reasoning preserves the validity of Rule 41(b), but only at 
the expense of casting doubt on other Federal Rules, notably Rule 13(a) on compulsory 
counterclaims and Rule 23 on class actions‖).  
 307. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 308. See supra Section II.A. 
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jurisdiction over certain ―Cases‖ and ―Controversies.‖309 Although courts 
are aware that, through precedent, they create ex ante general rules,
310
 they 
are nevertheless limited by evidentiary doctrines to examining ex post 
information about the parties' conduct that lead to the action before them. 
In contrast, Congress and state legislatures, which explicitly 
promulgate ex ante general laws, can avail themselves of relevant 
information to determine the impact of any proposed general law, 
including a procedure. Unlike federal courts, Congress has no limitations, 
evidentiary or otherwise, on the information it can collect and use to 
legislate. Indeed, one should not be too hard on Justice Stevens in Shady 
Grove because he himself recognized in a different context involving the 
setting of multiplier damages that ―Congress is far better situated than is 
this Court to assess the empirical data, and to balance competing policy 
interests, before making such a choice.‖311 
But federal courts are not powerless to deal with the informational 
demands of choosing between state and federal procedures. In fact, one 
approach for dealing with both problems of determining ambiguous 
legislative intent and substantive impact is to shift the costs of those 
inquiries to the legislatures themselves. In other words, one method of 
dealing with the choice of enforcement defaults is to use defaults 
themselves to force information from Congress and the states.
312
 
As suggested by Ronald Coase, the choice of initial default may be 
irrelevant because, due to the lack of transaction costs, the parties can 
bargain to the most efficient allocation of entitlements.
313
 Indeed, one 
could imagine that in many cases involving arbitration, forum-selection 
                                                                                                                     
 309. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 310. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P‘ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994). In that 
case, the Court concluded that a settlement agreement alone does not permit vacatur of judgment on 
appeal as moot. ―Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community 
as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court 
concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur.‖ Id. at 26 (quoting Izumi Seimitsu 
Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 311. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 516, 520 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the imposition of a multiplier to punitive damages 
as a matter of federal maritime common law).  
 312. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 91 (emphasizing the function of contract defaults, 
particularly penalty defaults, ―to reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially the 
courts)‖). A state court, rather than a state legislature, may define a state law procedure. But even in 
these situations state courts most likely will be in a better position to assess the substantive 
justifications and substantive impact of a procedure. This is because, unlike federal courts, state 
courts are less constrained in exercising their jurisdiction. There may be exceptions, however, and 
thus, as I argue below, it would make sense to improve the information-gathering capabilities of 
federal courts to improve their choices in the Erie context. See infra Part III.D.  
 313. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–15 (1960). 
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clauses, or governing law clauses, such ―Coasean irrelevance‖ obtains, 
thereby limiting the significance of the courts‘ choices of defaults.314  
But even when transaction costs are positive, as in the case of the costs 
associated with the passage of federal and state legislation, appropriately 
chosen defaults may result in optimal decisions by judges with minimal 
costs in ―contracting around‖ the default. Consider, yet again, Shady 
Grove. There, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, concluded that Rule 23 
applied because, following Sibbach, the Rule ―really regulates procedure,‖ 
consistent with the first sentence of the Enabling Act.
315
 Earlier this Article 
criticized Justice Scalia‘s approach to the second sentence of the Enabling 
Act, where, in Shady Grove and in other cases, he identified procedural 
entitlements such as the claim as ―substantive‖ when in fact they were 
procedural.
316
  
But suppose that Justice Scalia either corrected his view of what 
constitutes relevant substantive rights or, more likely, ignored the inquiry 
altogether, making the second sentence surplasage as in Sibbach. Justice 
Scalia would arguably be justified in taking the Sibbach approach for two 
reasons. The first would be deference. As suggested in Hanna v. Plumer, to 
refuse to apply any Rule that is ―rationally capable of classification‖ as 
procedure would be to conclude that ―the Advisory Committee[,] this 
Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in 
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor 
constitutional restrictions.‖317 Moreover, one could view the Rules 
Advisory Committee as better situated to consider the ex ante, general 
impact of a procedural rule given that it is tasked to consider such rules 
from that perspective, rather than the perspective of a case before it.
318
 
Indeed, the Rules Advisory Committee has the added advantage of 
reducing the transaction costs of congressional legislation by providing for 
a streamlined procedure for the promulgation of Rules that does not require 
bicameralism and presentment.
319
 
                                                                                                                     
 314. See Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Property Rights, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION 
ECONOMICS 2 (R. Gibbons & J. Roberts, eds. forthcoming) (discussing possibilities of ―Coasean 
Irrelevance‖ concerning the initial allocation of property rights). 
 315. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1435, 1443, 
1444, 1445 (2010) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (―We have held since Sibbach, and reaffirmed 
repeatedly, that the validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon whether it regulates 
procedure.‖). 
 316. See supra Section II.B. 
 317. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S 460, 471, 472 (1965). 
 318. See David Marcus, When Rules Are Rules: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Institutions in Legal Interpretation, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1852856 (arguing in favor of deference to the text and legislative history of 
the Rules given the institutional competence of the Advisory Committee). 
 319. See id. at 7–9 (describing the procedures that apply to the promulgation of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure). 
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The second reason for taking a Sibbach approach to applying the Rules 
would be to induce state legislatures to reveal information. By applying a 
Rule every time the Rule ―really regulates procedure,‖ a court, in a sense, 
is applying a ―penalty default‖ to induce states to articulate when the 
application of a federal procedure over a conflicting state procedure would 
―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ a ―substantive right.‖320  
This penalty default would be justified because, given the residual 
character of a state‘s powers under the Constitution, it is inherently 
ambiguous to read anything into a state‘s silence on the substantive 
justifications for a procedure, even though, admittedly, the second sentence 
of the Enabling Act imposes this ―state enclave‖ view.321 Accordingly, a 
state will always have more information with respect to its own substantive 
policies than the federal government, justifying the imposition of a penalty 
against the state to induce information as the better informed party.
322
  
In forcing states to reveal the substantive justifications for a procedure, 
a federal court would not necessarily require a state to show a procedure‘s 
substantive rationale. Instead, a state can alter the default of a Rule‘s 
validity by parroting the language of the Enabling Act, stating, in 
appropriate cases, that the displacement of a state procedure would 
―abridge, modify, or enlarge a substantive right.‖ This ―altering rule,‖ 
while arbitrary, would have the benefit of removing any doubt as to the 
justifications supporting a state procedure.
323
 Thus, a court can avoid the 
stumbling of Justice Stevens in Shady Grove in interpreting legislative 
history, as well as the more intensive inquiry into the ―context of history 
and system‖ that Professor Chayes suggested in determining the 
substantive justifications of a Rule.
324
 Indeed, such an approach argues 
against interpreting the Rules with sensitivity to the state interests 
involved, an approach that all of the current Justices endorse.
325
 Instead, 
                                                                                                                     
 320. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 97 (defining ―penalty defaults‖ as defaults that 
―encourage the production of information‖). 
 321. See Ely, supra note 9, at 701–03. 
 322. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 97 (noting that penalty defaults can be justified as 
―giving a more informed contracting party incentives to reveal information to a less informed 
party‖). 
 323. See Ayres, supra note 10, at 2080–81 (discussing ―arbitrary‖ altering rules where 
―[i]ncluding unusual (‗arbitrary‘) language . . . will assure that uninformed contractors will not 
unwittingly stumble upon the language‖). Indeed, one benefit of the use of arbitrary altering rules is 
that it ―is particularly well suited to reduce judicial error.‖ Id. at 2082.  
 324. See Chayes, supra note 127, at 753. 
 325. See, e.g., Semtek Int‘l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001) 
(Scalia, J.) (interpreting Rule 41(b) to avoid Enabling Act concerns); Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1461 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court must avoid ―immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would trench on 
state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest‖); id. at 1451 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that Rules must be interpreted with 
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courts should simply apply the Rule unless states utter the magic words to 
alter it. 
Finally, to avoid any concern with state opportunism, federal courts can 
simply look to Congress to express any countervailing considerations 
through federal legislation. As an initial matter, one could give courts some 
discretion to reject the invocation of ―magic words‖ by the state when the 
opportunism is obvious, which is another way of saying that a federal court 
could retain discretion to reject a procedure when the informational costs 
necessary to making that determination are low. But even when the 
opportunism is not obvious, Congress can pass legislation on any matter 
consistent with its enumerated powers in the Constitution. In fact, it has 
done so on numerous cases, particularly in the class action context, as 
evidenced by CAFA.
326
 
Courts may also use defaults in the same manner in the ―relatively 
unguided Erie‖ context.327 Admittedly, the outcome-determinative test 
under Erie does not require a federal court to determine the substantive 
justification for a state procedure, only the impact of the procedure on the 
―twin aims‖ of forum shopping and the ―inequitable administration of the 
laws.‖328 Accordingly, the ―unguided Erie‖ context does not lend itself to 
the use of formal methods to induce express declarations of substantive 
justifications.  
Nevertheless, existing precedent suggests that similar methods can be 
devised in the Erie context. In Byrd, for example, the Court emphasized 
that a federal court must determine whether a state procedure ―is bound up 
with [substantive] rights and obligations in such a way that its application 
in the federal court is required.‖329 Scholars have debated whether this 
―bound up‖ language imposes a separate requirement other than the 
outcome-determinative test.
330
 But perhaps it can be utilized to permit 
states to formally declare when a state procedure is ―bound up‖ with a 
right. Moreover, and similar to parroting the language of the second 
sentence of the Enabling Act, such an arbitrary altering rule would 
                                                                                                                     
―sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies‖ (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for 
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 326. See Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (expanding diversity jurisdiction and imposing limitations on class 
action settlements to prevent class attorneys from selling out the class); see also Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. 
L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 327. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1964). 
 328. Id. at 468. 
 329. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958).  
 330. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 78, at 1310 n.152 (concluding that the ―bound up‖ 
requirement is separate requirement). 
57
Campos: Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1630 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
eliminate any ambiguity associated with determining state intention.
331
 It 
would also allow courts to avoid the costs associated with applying the 
outcome-determinative test, which is far from easy.  
Finally, the use of such an altering rule as a penalty default in the Erie 
context would have the added advantage of giving presumptive validity to 
federal common law concerning gaps in federal procedure. In essence, the 
use of such default rules would optimize the political safeguards against 
common law overreaching. If a state concludes that a procedure is ―bound 
up‖ with a right, or that a different procedure would ―modify‖ a 
―substantive right,‖ then it can say so.332 Likewise if Congress disagrees 
with federal common law, it can pass a Rule, and if it further disagrees 
with a state‘s judgment as to the substantive impact of a procedure, it can 
pass a law. Indeed, using the ―bound up‖ language in Byrd would allow a 
court to avoid the messy inquiry surrounding whether there are, in fact, 
federal ―affirmative countervailing considerations‖ and simply wait for 
Congress to speak for itself.
333
 Accordingly, a federal court can exercise 
common law power secure in the knowledge that if it oversteps its bounds, 
Congress and the states will let it know. 
 
D.  Reducing Information Costs 
This Article concludes by briefly discussing the possibility that a 
federal court may have to do more than shift informational costs to other 
institutions. This is because the political safeguards against judicial 
overreaching may not work optimally due to other pathologies present in 
congressional and state legislative procedure. As an initial matter, the 
transaction costs associated with altering a default may be too ―sticky‖ to 
allow for optimal information revelation.
334
 The stickiest default of all is 
the Constitution, which is, in essence, a contract that governs the allocation 
of power between the federal government and the states.
335
 Given that it is 
nearly impossible to change the Constitution, this allocation of powers is 
difficult, if not impossible, to change,
336
 and Courts, Congress, the 
President, and others have had to use creative ways to modify the 
                                                                                                                     
 331. See Ayres, supra note 10, at 2080–81. 
 332. Indeed, such a penalty default would be an improvement over certifying questions to state 
courts, which is not only extremely costly, but arguably addresses the wrong branch of government. 
But see Gluck, supra note 7, at 1995–96 (advocating the greater use of certification of legal 
questions to state courts). 
 333. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.  
 334. See Ayres, supra note 10, at 2084–96 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of 
―sticky‖ altering rules). 
 335. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional 
Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1794 (2009) (showing parallels between the 
Constitution and international treaties). 
 336. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION 
GOES WRONG 3–9 (2006) (noting this difficulty). 
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Constitution outside of the Article V amendment process.
337
 Indeed, the 
ossification of the Constitution also extends to the procedures that apply to 
Congress, which, compounded with the unavailability of courts to review 
Congress‘s discretionary procedures, makes reform difficult.338 
Thus, there is the possibility that political safeguards may malfunction 
over time. There is, in fact, some evidence that some congressional 
procedures are already suboptimal. The increased use of the filibuster, for 
example, has exacerbated the already strong status quo bias that prevents 
the passage of legislation.
339
 Moreover, the same pathologies could infect 
state legislative procedures, leading to further suboptimal results. 
Given these possibilities, courts should consider improving their 
information-gathering capacity rather than relying upon defaults to shift the 
costs of information. Indeed, such a move would be in line with modern 
reforms to both the Executive Branch and Congress. For example, both 
branches have institutions that provide neutral, cost–benefit analyses of 
legislation or executive action. Specifically, the Executive Branch relies 
upon the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), while Congress 
similarly relies upon the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). It would 
make sense for the Judicial Branch to create a similar institution, if it has 
not already.
340
 The Federal Judiciary Center, for example, which compiles 
statistics for the judiciary, has already begun policy analysis of different 
judicial procedures, such as its recent (although flawed) report on the effect 
of the pleading standards under Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. 
Twombly.
341
 Moreover, at the appellate level courts have experimented 
with utilizing amicus curiae to address the policy ramifications of 
precedent.
342
 
Of course, there are restrictions on the evidence that courts can 
consider in their limited jurisdiction, but these evidentiary restrictions, like 
all Rules, are capable of change, either as a matter of federal common law 
                                                                                                                     
 337. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 290 (1991) (discussing 
constitutional amendments outside of the framework of Article V). 
 338. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502–05 (1969). 
 339. See GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE 
HOUSE AND SENATE (2010). 
 340. Admittedly, many have noted the deficiencies of cost-benefit analysis as it is currently 
practiced. But the imperfection of current analysis should not prevent us from trying to improve. 
See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=19892 
02 (noting limitations of cost–benefit analysis and proposing ―well-being analysis‖ as an alternative). 
 341. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: 
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (Mar. 2011), available 
at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf. I address this 
study in a separate article. See Christopher Cotton & Sergio J. Campos, Pleading and Selection 
Effects (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 342. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 437–38, 441 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(soliciting amicus briefs from relevant groups on proper interpretation of Rule 10b-5 liability). 
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or by Rule.
343
 Moreover, the improvement of the Court‘s information-
gathering capabilities would not otherwise impair the legitimacy of the 
political institutions. In fact, they would be premised on the failure of these 
institutions to fulfill their democratic functions.  
More importantly, improving the federal court‘s information-gathering 
capabilities to ensure optimal interventions would be consistent with John 
Hart Ely‘s ―antitrust . . . orientation‖ to democracy, which seeks to push 
substantive issues to the political branches, but allows for judicial 
intervention ―when the ‗market,‘ in [this] case the political market, is 
systematically malfunctioning.‖344 Such approaches to enhanced judicial 
review, in fact, have been justified on policy grounds.
345
 Indeed, one 
―pernicious‖ effect of Erie has been to undermine the legitimacy of court 
intervention in policy making when it may be necessary to preserve the 
functioning of our constitutional democracy.
346
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to clarify the Erie doctrine and suggest the use 
of legal techniques, specifically default rules, to improve the doctrine. But 
a larger goal of the Article is to demonstrate that the constitutional issues 
surrounding Erie which have preoccupied courts and scholars actually play 
virtually no role in assisting federal courts with the difficult choice of law 
that the doctrine addresses. Indeed, I have tried to show that the choice of 
law issue at the heart of Erie concerns mundane policy considerations 
concerning the enforcement function of civil liability, the relationship of 
litigation procedures to that function, and the ways in which the law can 
assist with the production and sharing of relevant information. Perhaps the 
irrepressible myth of Erie is that it matters at all. 
                                                                                                                     
 343. Ely, supra note 9, at 738–40 (arguing that Federal Rules of Evidence are well within 
scope of rulemaking power under the Enabling Act). 
 344. ELY, supra note 36, at 102–03. 
 345. See, e.g., Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in 
Government, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1034, 1035–36 (2004) (arguing that countermajoritarian judicial 
review can be welfare-enhancing). 
 346. Sherry, supra note 74, at 132 (emphasizing this ―pernicious‖ effect). 
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